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The target of this thesis is to study the influence of the WTO on Russian trade through the improved 
quality of Russian institutions by using a gravity model. It is investigated whether the improvement 
of the quality of Russian institutions to the EU standards will increase Russian export and import.  
The theoretical part of this thesis consists of the theoretical framework of the influence of 
institutions on trade and the review of the empirical literature on the impact of the WTO on trade 
and institutions.  
In the empirical part the gravity model is estimated for Russian export and import for the years 
2000-2011. The influence of institutions on trade is estimated by using the Ordinary Least Squares 
(OLS), the Instrumental Variable (IV) and the Poisson Pseudo Maximum Likelihood (PPML) 
methods. The estimation results indicate that Russian institutions have a positive impact on the 
Russian trade. Russian export has a potential to increase up to 39% and import up to 27% in the 
PPML estimates if Russian institutions obtained the quality of the European institutions, due to the 
WTO accession. The institutions of the Russian partners influence negatively Russian trade, unless 
the endogeneity issues are accounted for. The post-estimation tests revealed that the endogeneity is 
a serious issue and the IV method gives more reliable results than the OLS method. The PPML 
method proved to be an appropriate estimator due to the big amount of zero observations in the 
data.  
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1 Introduction 
The main goal of this thesis is to evaluate the impact of the WTO on trade of Russia 
through its impact on institutional quality. This chapter is intended to provide background 
information for this thesis.  The first part covers Russia’s admission process to the WTO and 
describes the quality of Russian institutions. In the second part the motivation for the study, the 
research problem and the applied methods are discussed, followed by the limitations of the study. 
Finally, the general structure of the thesis is provided.  
1.1 Background  
In 1985 the economy of USSR was stagnating and there was an urgent need for reforms. The head 
of the State Mikhail Gorbachev took measures to restructure the economy in order to make it more 
efficient. Specifically, by the end of his rule in 1993 USSR applied to join GATT. Russia was 
facing a lot of financial challenges after the collapse of the USSR and several liberalization reforms, 
such as elimination of the government monopoly on foreign trade, removal of the ban on foreign 
investment, establishment of convertibility of Russian ruble into foreign currencies. Those 
challenges were a rather important stimulus for Russia to join the WTO in order to make the 
economy more competitive.  
During the negotiation process with the WTO a lot of pressure was put on Russia to reform fast, as 
the economic institutions turned out to be weak and inefficient in the new environment after the 
opening of the Russian economy (Vercuiel, 2007, 12). The main disputes during the negotiations on 
admission covered financial markets, car industry, imports of agricultural products and intellectual 
rights.  
When Russia became admitted to the WTO in 2012, it was the last major economy whose 
international trade was not governed by the WTO.  The overall economic impact from accession has 
been less significant for Russia than the benefits from gaining trust from the international partners 
due to implementing a trustworthy institutional framework (Belton, 2012). After the collapse of the 
Soviet Union the state did not have the required authority and the laws to protect the rights of 
ownership or to ensure market rules. As entrepreneurs did not feel support from the state, they 
asked for private protection from particular state officials. For modern Russia the transition period 
of the economy has been not smooth due to the imperfect institutions that were inherited from the 
Soviet period and the rules of behavior of political and economic system. It takes a long time for the 
Russian market to change the settled methods of doing business that use the weakness of the state 
for private profit (Levin & Satarov, 2000, 115). The major challenge for Russia in the recent years 
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has been strengthening the rule of law that involves improving the quality of supporting institutions 
and eliminating corruption. The problem of making institutions more effective is a political issue 
because a certain group of officials and businessmen benefit from corruption and a weak rule of 
law. Despite certain progress in rationalizing the legal institutions during the last 20 years, the most 
serious barrier to economy modernization are still the political obstacles in improving the rule of 
law (Frye, 2010, 80). 
The “Doing business” ranking of the World Bank (Table 1) can be used to assess the institutions 
and the rule of law in Russia and compare it to developed countries, BRIC countries and former 
USSR countries. According to its parameters, the ranking of Russia differs a lot. For example, 
Trading Across Borders assesses costs (excluding tariffs), time and number of necessary documents 
to export and import goods by ocean transport. Russia received a low ranking in this index, which 
means that Russian bureaucracy is not efficient enough to facilitate trade. However, it might be 
expected that the ranking will improve in the following years as in 2012 Russia made a reform of 
reducing the number of formal procedures needed for trade (World Bank d, 20.09.2012). 
On the other hand, in the Contract Enforcement index Russia is ranked higher than the other BRIC 
countries, Ukraine and Kazakhstan. The index measures the effectiveness of the judicial system in 
resolving commercial disputes. It takes into account codes of civil procedure and other court 
regulations as well as surveys completed by lawyers and judges.  
Table 1: Rule of law in Russia  
Country Finland Germany France China India Brazil Ukraine Russia Kazakhstan 
Trading Across 
Borders 
6 12 24 60 109 121 140 160 176 
Contract 
Enforcement 
11 8 6 16 182 118 44 13 27 
 Source: World Bank, Doing business 2012, www.doingbusiness.org 
The amount of corruption in Russia is very significant. Russian INDEM Foundation estimated in 
2008 that Russian officials receive yearly bribes of $318 billion. The level of corruption in Russia is 
comparable to such countries as Belarus, Nigeria, and Uganda (Transparency International, 
21.10.2012). Corruption in Russia increases unfair and unlawful redistribution of resources in favor 
of limited groups, worsening the situation of the rest of the population. Because of the major 
negative impact of corruption on Russian economy, the government is taking measures to eliminate 
it. One example of this is the introduction of the National Anticorruption Strategy in 2010 with its 
main goal to establish legislative and institutional frameworks for countering corruption (National 
Anti-Corruption Strategy, 17.09.2012). 
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Summing up, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia was left with inefficient institutions and 
a corrupted economy that was not able to ensure the rule of law. Despite the efforts of the Russian 
Government to improve the situation, major problems in economy and inefficient institutions are 
still present. It can be concluded that an external force as the WTO is needed in order to facilitate 
the improvement of institutions as well as to make Russian Government commit to the institutional 
reform. It is important to state that the benefits from the WTO membership can only be explored if 
Russia will be active and willing to implement the reforms on institutional improvement. According 
to Hanson & Cameron (2012), the rule of law and democracy will not be improved right away due 
to the accession, but the practice implementing an international rules-based trading system should 
have a gradual effect on the legal system. 
1.2 Research problem, method and main results. 
Russia is a transition economy and faces a lot of challenges in transferring to the market economy. 
The quality of its institutions and the general situation in the Russian economy is far from that of 
developed countries and a lot of improvements need to be done. In this case recent accession of 
Russia to the WTO provides a unique opportunity to benefit from the requirements of economic 
improvements that the WTO imposes on its members. It is expected that the WTO accession will 
improve the quality of institutions in Russia as well as be the reason for the increase in its volume 
of trade. Better institutions should improve the commercial code defining contracts, introduce more 
efficient sanctions of foreign arbitration of contract disputes and enforce the protection of property 
rights (Babecká Kucharčuková & Maurel, 2004, 691). 
The main research problem of this thesis is to answer the question whether the trade in Russia will 
be increased after the WTO accession due to the improved institutional quality. The target of the 
study is important as due to the recent accession of Russia to the WTO it is essential to know how 
Russian economy and trade will change because of that. There are several reasons why the change 
in the trade flows is assessed through the improvement of institutional quality. First, as Russia has 
just recently joined the WTO, it is difficult to make any concrete predictions for the future change 
of Russia’s trade volumes, and introducing the change of institutional quality enables to create an 
empirical model of the improvement of the Russian economy after the accession, and thus, assess 
how it will influence the trade flows. Second, the views of researchers whether the WTO has any 
impact on the country’s trade flows diverse and one of the suggested reasons why this happens is 
that country’s home institutions play an major role in the effect that WTO will have on the 
country’s trade volumes. 
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There is a scarcity of empirical studies measuring how institutions are important for trade. 
Particularly for Russia there is only few studies that assess the influence of the WTO on the trade 
flows, that is why this thesis is a contribution to the research done in that field. Furthermore, this 
paper investigates the impact of the WTO on the trade through institutions in two steps: first, the 
influence of the WTO on institutions is discussed. Second, the influence of institutions on trade is 
assessed.  
The model that is used in the empirical part is the gravity model, which is used to explain the 
variation in the country pairs’ trade flows. Differently from other research done for Russian trade, 
both gravity equations for exports and for imports are estimated in order to distinguish the influence 
of institutions on export and import separately. The choice of the gravity setting is explained by its 
wide usage and proved empirical success. I use three econometric methods: the traditional OLS 
method, IV (Instrumental Variable) method, to deal with the endogeneity, and the PPML method to 
account for zero trade. The novelty of the research is that it properly tackles the issue of zero trade 
flows problem, which is specifically pointed out in the most recent studies as an important factor to 
consider in order to obtain unbiased estimations. Most studies of Russia’s accession to the WTO do 
not tackle this issue properly.  
The estimation results of this thesis indicate that Russian institutions influence positively Russian 
trade. In case the WTO accession encouraged Russian institutions to obtain the level of quality of 
the EU institutions, export would increase up to 39% and import up to 27% in the PPML estimates. 
The institutions of the Russian partners have a negative influence on Russian trade, unless the 
endogeneity issues are taken into account. The PPML method proved to be appropriate due to the 
big amount of zero observations in the data.  
1.3 Limitations of the study 
There are some limitations in the study. This thesis does not have a multilateral setup and focuses 
only on Russia’s pairwise trade with other countries. This is usually done in order to model more 
precisely the country-specific parameters. For the case of this thesis, it enables to distinguish the 
influence of Russian institutions from the influence of the Russian Partners’ institutions. Gravity 
equation specification makes it possible to include different country characteristics that influence its 
trade (i. e. membership in trade unions, FDI). This thesis focuses solely on the quality of 
institutions, therefore limiting the number of included independent variables. The reason for this is 
that the main question of the thesis is if institutions have an influence on trade. Hence, there is first 
a discussion about existing empirical evidence, why Russian institutions should improve due to the 
WTO, followed by an then estimation of the gravity equation with included institutional variables to 
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see by how much the improvement of the quality of the institutions will increase trade (in case there 
is a positive dependence of trade on institutional quality). 
Panel estimations are not performed in this thesis for several reasons. Firstly, institutional variables 
used in this thesis vary little over time. As it will be discussed in Chapter 6.2 it is not recommended 
to use fixed effects estimation when some of the variables vary little over time. 
As the PPML model proved to be specified correctly (based on the RESET test, Chapter 7.3.2) and 
there is a threat of having problems with fixed effects, fixed or random effects estimation methods 
were not introduced in this thesis. Another reason for not using panel estimations is that there is no 
command written for estimating fixed and random effects in the PPML set up. 
1.4 Structure of the study 
The research will be done in several steps. In the first chapter, the research problem, motivation for 
the study and study methods are described. In the second chapter the overall impact of WTO on 
world trade is introduced followed by a discussion about the influence of WTO on institutions in 
the third chapter. In Chapter 4 the dependence of trade on the quality of institutions is analyzed both 
by theoretical model as well as by empirical evidence. Afterwards (Chapter 5), the gravity model 
framework that is used in the empirical part is explained in detail. As well, the used empirical 
methods are gone through. Chapter 6 concentrates on describing the data and variables included in 
the gravity equation. The results of the empirical part are presented in Chapter 7. First, the general 
results, obtained from estimating the gravity equation are discussed. Second, the influence of 
institutions on trade is analyzed. Chapter 7 ends by presenting additional post estimation tests, used 
to check for the quality of the obtained results. Finally, the study is concluded in the last chapter and 
possible ideas for the future research are presented. 
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2 Influence of WTO on world trade 
The GATT/WTO is one of the most successful examples of an international institution attempting 
to supervise and liberalize international trade. WTO officially commenced on January 1, 1995, 
replacing under the Marrakech Agreement the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), 
which commenced in 1948. Since the founding of GATT/WTO the number of member countries 
has expanded to a high extent since its founding, and international trade has grown in tandem 
(Goldstein et al. 2007, 38).  
There are various ways of looking at the World Trade Organization. Firstly, it was built with the 
aim of trade opening, where governments could negotiate trade agreements. Secondly, it is entitled 
to be a forum to settle trade disputes. Thirdly, the WTO operates a system of trade rules. 
Fundamentally, the WTO was created to help member governments to try to sort out the trade 
problems they face with each other (WTO a, 15.09.2012).  
There are certain opinions in the literature about the influence of the WTO on trade flows. Rose 
(2004) was the first one to provide empirical assessment of the influence of the WTO on trade. Rose 
obtained striking results that despite all the talks of the world leaders about the positive influence of 
the WTO on trade, there was no empirical evidence that the WTO actually increased trade flows. 
This statement put to risk the existence of the WTO, as one of the main reasons why it was created 
was to increase trade flows between countries and to improve trade conditions. The study by Rose 
(2004) caused big discussions among economists. Some of them agreed with Rose and found new 
evidence that the WTO did not influence bilateral trade increase. Others claimed that the study by 
Rose obtained negative results because certain important factors were not taken into consideration. 
By improving the analysis procedure, those economists managed to prove that the trade increased 
significantly due to the WTO. The views both for and against this statement are covered below.  
2.1 Empirical results against the impact of the WTO on trade  
This part covers the empirical results that did not obtain evidence of the influence of the WTO on 
trade. Table 2 describes empirical methods used by the authors of the papers and their main 
findings. 
Table 2: Empirical results against the impact of the WTO on trade 
Author  Empirical methods  Main findings  
Rose (2004) OLS, GLS, fixed effects  Countries joining or belonging to the GATT/WTO do not 
have different from outsiders trade patterns. 
Rose (2005) OLS, GLS, fixed effects  Effect of the WTO membership on trade for the WTO 
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members is insignificant, but when a country joins the 
WTO there is a trade-creating effect. 
Eicher & Henn 
(2011)  
Control for multilateral resistance, 
unobserved bilateral 
heterogeneity, and individual 
preferential trade agreements  
The WTO affects trade flows insignificantly, while 
Preferentail trade agreements (PTAs) produce strong but 
uneven trade effects. Omitted variable bias is very 
important for right estimations. 
Roy (2011) Inclusion of zero trade, control for 
multilateral resistance, proper 
membership definition 
Formal membership in the WTO is never found to 
increase bilateral trade. 
Source : created by the author 
By using the gravity equation Rose (2004) measured the effect on trade when both countries were 
the members of the GATT/WTO and in case one country was a member and the other was not. By 
using the ordinary least squares method (OLS), random effects (GLS) and fixed effects estimators, 
he showed that there was no evidence of increased trade flows between formal members of the 
GATT/WTO. Rose believed that the reasons for not observing an effect of the WTO membership 
on trade were the following: first, most-favored-nation status was extended to outsiders even 
without obligation to do so; second, developing countries were not forced enough by the WTO 
membership to improve trade policies. He suggested that the observed trade increase in some 
countries was not influenced by the WTO but was due to various other possible reasons like higher 
rates of productivity, reduced transport costs, converging tastes, the economy shifting to services, 
growing international liquidity (Rose, 2004, 112).  There was a certain critique of the analysis done 
by Rose (2004). Most importantly, in his study only formal memberships in the GATT/WTO were 
included, while other forms of participation were completely neglected (Goldstein et al. 2007, 52).  
A year later Rose (2005) repeated his research in order to understand how several international 
organizations influenced trade. He used various methods such as OLS, fixed effects and random 
effects. He employed fixed effects estimator in order to maintain economical and statistical 
significance and claimed that the effect of membership on trade for the WTO members was 
insignificant. Although, by using the fixed effect estimator he showed that when a country joined 
the WTO there was a trade-creating effect. But, this effect was not observed in the long run when 
the country already belonged to the organization. 
Another study done by Roy (2011) also showed that formal membership in the WTO did not 
influence trade. In the study both the issue of the zero trade and the need to control for the 
multilateral resistance terms were taken into account in order to obtain accurate results.  
The author believes that the study by Eicher & Henn (2011) is the best example of the research on 
the WTO that has a result of unchanged trade effects, as in their study they unified the approaches 
by Rose (2004), Subramanian & Wei (2007), Tomz et al. (2007) and claimed that to show no effect 
of the WTO on trade it was enough to control for multilateral resistance. Multilateral resistance 
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occurs when exports depend not only on bilateral trade costs, but as well on bilateral trade costs 
relative to a measure of both countries' trade costs to all other countries (Rudolph, 2010). Eicher & 
Henn (2011) believe that until now the opinions of economists diverged due to the omitted variable 
bias such as multilateral resistance, unobserved bilateral heterogeneity, and individual preferential 
trade agreements (PTA) trade effects. That is why their empirical methodology accounted for the 
following biases: multilateral resistance, by introducing time-varying importer dummies; 
unobserved bilateral heterogeneity, by adding country-pair fixed effects to the dataset; and effects 
across PTAs, by introducing PTA indicator dummies. The omission of country-pair fixed effects 
leads to the estimates to be biased upwards (Baldwin & Taglioni, 2006). Eicher & Henn (2011) 
concluded that the influence of PTAs affected strongly the results of the research on the WTO 
because when these individual PTAs were not taken into account in the empirical approach, the 
WTO coefficient may have been biased upward, as the WTO and PTA memberships overlap. This 
may be the reason why positive results on the dependence of trade flows to the WTO were obtained 
in some studies. But, once extending the gravity model to recognize the difference between the 
WTO and PTA, they obtained the result that PTA, created trade strongly, but unevenly across 
individual agreements.  
2.2 Empirical results in favor of the impact of the WTO on trade 
In this part the empirical results that provided evidence of the influence of the WTO on trade are 
discussed. The summary of the important findings and the empirical methods used by the authors of 
the papers is presented in Table 3. 
Table 3: Empirical results in favor of the impact of the WTO on trade 
Author  Empirical methods  Main findings  
Goldstein et 
al. (2007)  
OLS, fixed and random effects  All members benefited from the GATT/WTO, 
including developing nations. 
Subramanian 
& Wei 
(2007)  
Control for multirateral resistance, 
time-varying importer and exporter fixed 
effects  
The WTO had a positive impact on industrial country 
imports, hence, developing countries exports also 
increased.  
Liu (2009)  Control for zero trade and 
Heteroskedasticity  
The WTO increases trade between existing trading 
partners and new trading relationships are created.  
Chang & 
Lee (2011) 
Nonparametric methods (a pair-matching 
estimator, sensitivity analysis based on 
signed-rank tests), control for time-varying 
multilateral resistance terms 
Large GATT/WTO trade-promoting effects that are 
robust to various restricted matching criteria of the 
trading countries. 
Source : created by the author 
Goldstein et al. (2007) showed in their study that all members benefited from the GATT/WTO, 
including developing nations. They used OLS method to estimate the gravity equation, taking into 
account fixed effects and time-varying effects. As well, they introduced a measure of participation, 
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which included all nations following the GATT/WTO rules and having privileges, taking into 
account formal members as well as nonmembers. By the use of nonpolitical variables, such as 
proximity and national income, it was shown that the overall effect of participating in the GATT/ 
WTO resulted in an increase of trade about 43 % among WTO members, relative to pairs of non-
participants. Moreover, there was a trade increase for both formal members and non-member 
participants due to the GATT/WTO (Goldstein et al. 2007, 55). This can be explained by the fact 
that GATT/WTO created rights and obligations both for its members and non-members, including 
colonies and newly independent states. Another issue covered in the study by Goldstein et al. 
(2007) was whether the benefits of the WTO participation stay or trade increases only during 
liberalization in the early years. To answer this question they compared trade after each negotiating 
round and found that when both countries participated in the agreement, the increase in trade varied 
from a significant 136 % after the first round to 24 % after the Tokyo Round (Goldstein et al. 2007, 
56). The WTO effect on trade was largest in the early years when only a small number of countries 
participated and outsiders retained high barriers to trade. 
According to the paper by Subramanian & Wei (2007), the GATT/WTO was the reason why the 
world import increased 120%, as estimated for year 2000. In their study they emphasized general 
equilibrium trade effects by controlling for multilateral resistance (using time-varying importer and 
exporter fixed effects). They argued that there existed asymmetries that influenced the patterns of 
bilateral trade flows and made the promoting role of the GATT/WTO more uneven. In the paper it 
is stated that developing countries also benefited from the WTO membership. Their exports also 
increased significantly caused by the positive impact of the WTO on industrial country imports. 
Due to the GATT/WTO, developing country exports to industrial countries were at least one and a 
half times greater (Subramanian & Wei, 2007, 174). This means that even if developing countries 
did not achieve a sufficient level of liberalization, they indirectly benefited from industrial country 
liberalization.  
Liu (2009) suggested that the GATT/WTO not only increases trade between existing trading 
partners, but also it was the reason why new trading relationships were created. In his study two 
GATT/WTO members traded 60% more compared to the situation when neither country was a 
GATT/WTO member and 23% more when only one country was the WTO member. This means 
that nearly one-third of total world trade during 1948–2003 was due to the GATT/WTO (Liu, 2009, 
431).  Liu (2009) criticized previous studies where only positive trade observations were taken into 
account in the traditional log-linear gravity regressions. This lead to eliminating zero trade 
observations, thus, losing information on new trading relationships. Those relationships arise when 
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two countries did not trade initially, but started to trade after one of them obtained membership in 
the GATT/WTO. In order to obtain more precise estimations Liu (2009, 22) suggested using 
Poisson quasimaximum likelihood estimation to uncover the role of the GATT/WTO. As log-linear 
gravity regression only provides first order approximation, the higher-order approximations are left 
in the residuals and heteroskedasticity occurs. In contrast, Poisson estimation is consistent in the 
presence of heteroskedasticity and can be used in the case when the dependent variable has zero 
values (Silvia & Tenreyro, 2006, 645). 
Chang & Lee (2011) followed the study by Liu (2009) and used only cases when two countries 
started bilateral trade before either one of them joined the GATT/WTO. By doing so, Chang & Lee 
(2011) eliminated the membership effect on prompting new trading relationships. In this case it was 
possible to observe distinctly the membership effect on the trade volumes. Their analysis was based 
on the dataset used by Rose (2004) and, as a robustness check, the dataset provided by Tomz et al. 
(2007).  Chang & Lee (2011) argued that parametric estimation of gravity-based trade models may 
lead to misspecifications, diverse membership effects, and unobserved selection bias. In order to 
eliminate those, they used non-parametric methods such as a pair-matching estimator to estimate the 
strength of the influence to unobserved variables 1
To sum up, the results obtained in the WTO empirical literature strongly diverse. From this the 
author concludes that econometric specifications have a high impact on the WTO trade effects. 
Both for economists and policy makers it is crucial to understand the reason for such a diversity of 
results. Understanding when gains from the WTO can be expected and in what circumstances is 
essential for policymakers before taking a decision of entering the WTO (Eicher & Henn, 2011). As 
argued by Basu (2008, 5) the studies obtained different results on the influence of the WTO on trade 
because trade-specific effects were measured only of acceding countries via membership and the 
influence of the WTO on the domestic economic policies and institution-building was neglected. 
Basu's conclusions are supported by the following two papers. First, Li & Wu (2004, 139) made an 
assessment of the countries where proper working institutions already existed before joining the 
WTO. They divided countries by income (high and low income countries) and stated that high 
income economies that had initially proper economic institutions benefited from joining the 
. The study showed that trade increased 
significantly for bilateral partners that had both chosen to be members of the WTO. The result of 
the WTO membership was larger than bilateral trade preference arrangements.  
                                                        
1   See: Chang P., Lee M. (2011) The WTO trade effect. Journal of International Economics. Vol. 85, Issue 1, Pp. 53–
71 
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GATT/WTO more than the countries with poor institutions. Second, Allee & Scaleraand (2012) 
discussed how the requirements of the WTO to improve institutions affected trade. They concluded 
that when there were stronger requirements to change policies before joining the WTO, the more 
the country benefited from the membership and experienced higher trade volumes after joining.  
As a country’s home institutions play an important role in the effect that the WTO will have on 
trade, in the next two chapters this thesis will focus on the influence of the WTO on a country’s 
trade through institutions. The investigation of this influence will be made in two steps: first, 
evidence of the impact of the WTO on home institutions will be provided, and second the influence 
of home institutions on the country´s trade will be discussed. 
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3 Impact of the WTO accession on home institutions  
According to the WTO Secretariat, proper institutions in a country promote open trade. There exist 
additional damages resulted from trade barriers because they provide opportunities for corruption 
and other forms of poor governance. The WTO rules require transparency in the trade regulation, 
thus help to minimize the opportunity for corruption and build better institutions (WTO b, 
15.09.2012). This chapter discusses the impact of the WTO on the institutions of the country. First, 
general evidence and empirical results on this subject are presented. Next, as this thesis focuses on 
Russia, discuss Russia´s accession process is discussed in order to provide arguments that the WTO 
membership will influence the quality of the Russian institutions. 
3.1 Influence of the WTO on institutions and governance 
The WTO has an important role of providing help for newly admitted countries to successfully 
integrate in the international trading system. Trade policy reform required by the WTO contributes 
to the economic development as it helps to build high quality institutions (Rodrik, 2000, 2). Before 
obtaining membership in the WTO, there is a long negotiating process that may last for decades. 
Countries have to agree on a number of commitments to redesign their domestic economic structure 
and institutional framework, and to make economic conditions more stable and predictable.  
Any country that wants to take the most from membership in the WTO should use it as a tool to 
support the implementation of policies supporting export-oriented production and activities in 
which the country has a comparative advantage. As the WTO rules focus on providing market 
access to foreign companies, greater competition is created in the country, which is generally 
beneficial to an economy. But at the same time policies and mechanisms should be present in the 
country to support the functioning of the market. When establishing the standards and institutions 
required by the WTO, countries can increase the value added of the WTO membership by creating 
independent institutions aimed at enhancing transparency of trade policy decision-making, which is 
encouraged by the WTO, but it is not a strict requirement (WTO c, 15.09.2012).  
There is empirical evidence that after the WTO accession the institutions of the countries improved. 
As argued by Basu (2008, 20) the process of obtaining membership in the WTO for 21 recently 
accessed countries lead to better domestic institutions. By using the Feasible Generalized Least 
Squares method to capture the influence of the WTO on the institutions, Basu (2008) found that 
new WTO members benefited from the negotiation process, during which the WTO was an 
‘external’ policy anchor helping to introduce changes in domestic institutions.  
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In contrast to Basu (2008), who used several metrics to measure the quality of institutions (e. g. 
Heritage Foundation Index), Aaronson & Abouharb (2011) took another approach and studied 
whether the WTO had an impact on the behavior of the governments on establishing better policies. 
During and after the accession process, future members follow formal WTO requirements on 
institutional improvement as well as the members of the WTO can influence the actions of potential 
members. The results of the empirical research made by Aaronson & Abouharb (2011, 27)  
correspond to the results obtained by Basu (2008), as for 23 new member admitted in the period 
1995-2007 negotiations during the accession process to the WTO lead to improved institutions and 
better governance. They found as well that the positive effect of WTO on institutions lasted not 
only for the period of negotiations but as well after the country was accepted, which can be 
explained by the influence of the country members on each other. It is important to mention that 
Aaronson & Abouharb (2011) introduced Three Stage Least Squares estimation in order to capture 
the influence of the WTO on institution. 
Due to the fact that this thesis focuses on Russia, it is reasonable to provide evidence for countries 
with a comparable to Russian economic situation. Research done for the transition countries can be 
a good benchmark, as Russia also belongs to the group of transition countries. Drabek & Bacchetta 
(2004) found that the WTO membership not only provided better market access to the transition 
countries, but also resulted in better institutions in those countries. For transition countries the WTO 
membership implied less corruption and improved governance without major government revenue 
loss.  
China is a good example of a transition economy that, as well as Russia, has taken measures to 
move from a centralized economy towards market economy. China´s accretion process to the WTO 
in 2001 was one of the most followed among the transition countries. Chow (2001, 13) described 
historical trends of the forces toward the development of democratic political institutions in China, 
and expected a positive impact of the WTO on those trends. Lopez (2005) assessed the situation in 
China after five years it had been a member of the WTO.  In the paper he argued that the Accession 
commitments (Transitional review mechanism and Dispute settlement mechanism) introduced strict 
discipline to China’s non-market trade practices. The approach of slow institutional transformation 
was successful for China as after five years the private sector was growing, domestic prices were 
almost completely liberalized and needed institutional changes were made to support market 
economy. 
Former Soviet Union countries are a special group of transition countries as their institutional and 
policy environments, which emerged from central planning, are considerably different from the rest 
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of the group. This leads to certain differences in the opportunities and challenges associated with 
the WTO membership. Under central planning only state enterprises and institutions governing 
international trade existed. The requirements of the WTO to bring the institutions to international 
standards involved profound changes in the laws for the operation of the markets free from central 
government control (Michalopoulos, 1999, 2). 
In conclusion, accession to the WTO is not an answer to all problems with the country’s institutions 
and governance in general.  The WTO measures are not enough to eliminate regulatory barriers that 
prevent domestic companies to exploit the opportunities of specialization resulting from integration 
into the world economy (Hoekman & Roy, 2000, 26). Although accession and membership in the 
WTO plays a big role in the path of trade liberalization and building better institutions, a lot 
depends on the policies that are pursued independently by the governments. 
3.2 Russia´s accession process to the WTO as evidence of impact of the WTO on institutions 
The WTO accession process can be a useful tool for introducing institutional changes in the country. 
The process has an impact on a wide range of policies and institutions, such as tariff policy, 
customs, rights of foreign investors, standards and intellectual property rights (Tarr & Volochkova, 
2010, 202). Accession process starts with an establishment of a multilateral working party, where 
the WTO members investigate whether the candidate´s trade regime is consistent with the WTO 
rules. Two of the main areas of attention are: economic policies connected with imports and exports 
and the institutional framework that enforces such policies (Basu, 2008, 10). Acceding members 
commit to altering their laws, regulations, and other standards or practices to the standards of the 
WTO (Cattaneo & Braga, 2009, 19). It is worth to mention that under the unified structure of the 
WTO Agreement, the obligations of the acceding countries should be the same as those of the 
existing members. However, the specific provision of the WTO Agreement on accession for a 
certain country may not comply with that principle (Qin, 2003, 487). Therefore, more requirements 
may be imposed on acceding members than on existing members.  
The accession requirements encourage countries to establish better institutions and improve 
economic situation. Each accession process is unique as different economic conditions are taken 
into account during negotiation. As this paper looks into the case of Russia, Russia´s accession 
process is discussed only. Despite the steps already taken to improve the legal and economic 
situation in Russia there is a certain amount of concern whether the laws are applied effectively. At 
this point Russian economy does not correspond to all the standards of a modern market economy 
and, therefore, there are still a lot of improvements that need to be done by Russia to comply with 
the WTO standards, which emphasize trade liberalization and the rule of law (Kerr, 2012, 150). 
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Amidst the most serious problems that still require a lot of attention are weak property rights, 
corruption and poor rule of law, as well as crony capitalism, when political decisions are heavily 
dependent on the business elite (Kerr, 2012, 154). 
Mandatory external management for internal reform, that Russia is expected to obtain due to joining 
the WTO, is especially important as institutional stabilization is essential in Russia’s development. 
According to Tarr & Volochkova (2010, 221) Russia will derive large benefits from the WTO 
accession and the largest ones will result from its own liberalization commitments. They argue that 
the WTO accession is a unique opportunity for Russia, as the commitments to comply with the 
WTO standards “lock in” the reform of institutional quality in such a way that it cannot be easily 
reversed by future less reform-minded administration. 
Lapin (2012) argues that membership in the WTO will help to improve the rule of law, as Russia 
gave commitments to provide transparency of legislation affecting international trade. The 
acceptance of the WTO Government Procurement Agreement, that establishes rules against 
corruption, is an example of the actions taken by Russia to improve its rule of law. Among other 
WTO Agreements that are aimed at reducing corruption are Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) and 
Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) Agreements, as well as the Agreement on Customs Valuation.  
During accession negotiations several structural reforms were demanded from Russia targeting at 
improving and stabilizing the legal system for economic activities (Vercueil, 2007, 10). The 
evidence of the legal system´s transformation were the twelve legislative texts that were issued with 
the direct reference to the WTO accession negotiations. Administrative registration procedures were 
simplified, companies obtained more rights during inspections (Vercueil, 2007, 15). Aiming at 
improving the business environment and the legal framework supporting it, Russia ratified the 
OECD convention on combating bribery in 2012 (Lapin, 2012). 
Summing up, there are a lot of benefits for Russia in the WTO. The membership in the WTO will 
help to integrate Russia into the global economy, will bring higher certainty and stability to the 
internal market as well as trading partners, establish the rule of trade law (Lamy, 2011, 3). The 
commitments, that acceding members make, imply domestic economic reforms targeted at 
improving domestic efficiency, strengthening market institutions, therefore reducing the riskiness of 
international trade engagement with this country and potentially leading to higher trade. According 
to Kerr (2012, 152) this should definitely be the case for small economies, but for a large economy 
like Russia, there will be more efficient results only if Russia takes effort in further liberalizing its 
economy and establishing better institutions.  
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4 Impact of institutions on trade  
Proper functioning institutions are important for the country as they reduce the costs of transaction 
of economic agents and structure interaction between them. It is required from domestic institutions 
to provide contract enforcement, protect property rights and ensure the rule of law. (Büge, 2010, 3) 
Such institutional factors as poor efficiency of bureaucracy, corruption, possibility of expropriation 
of private property by government create uncertainty among economic agents and discourage them 
from trading with the country (Faruq, 2011, 586). The aim of this chapter is to analyze the impact of 
institutions on trade from two different perspectives: by providing theoretical explanation of the 
influence of institutions on trade and discussing empirical evidence. 
The analysis of the impact of domestic institutions on trade has attracted the attention of economists 
just recently. Most of the papers are focused only at the empirical research, without introducing any 
theoretical model. Only few papers develop a theoretical framework for their empirical analysis. 
Most of the papers that use a theoretical model base their theory on the model presented by 
Anderson and Young (2006). Hence, Fatica (2010) estimated the effect of institutional quality on 
FDI with the help of the theoretical framework that followed the ideas of Anderson and Young 
(2006) that poor institutions were the reason for additional costs facing market agents. The 
empirical research done by Anderson & Marcouiller (2002) analyzed the effect of insecurity on the 
patterns of trade flows. Their theoretical model was based on the earlier version (year 1999) of the 
paper by Anderson and Young (2006). 
4.1 Impact of institutions on trade: theoretical framework 
The impact of institutions on trade can be analyzed in various ways. The model by Anderson & 
Young (2000 (a)) shows that the presence of proper working institutions benefits trade by analyzing 
the direct impact of institutions on trade. In this model the implications of different institutional 
settings for traders are assessed and the situations of the Rule of law and the Anarchy as the 
extremes of the development of institutions are introduced. This model is important as it confirms 
that trade volumes depend on the availability of proper institutions. Another model by Anderson & 
Young (2006), includes some ideas from the model by Anderson & Young (2000 (a)), and develops 
a trade model with imperfect contract enforcement. This model shows that institutional 
improvement increases trade volumes. As this thesis is aimed at analyzing the possibility of Russian 
trade increase through the better quality of Russian institutions, the theoretical model by Anderson 
& Young (2006) is discussed in more detail. As well their model can be a good introduction to the 
empirical part of this thesis as it is possible to obtain the gravity equation from that theoretical 
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model. The working paper for the article by Anderson & Young (2006) was used as well to present 
specifications of some calculations. 
In order to understand how the ability of institutions to enforce contracts influence trade volumes 
and whether the improvement of institutions will increase trade Anderson & Young (2006) create 
the model of equilibrium under imperfect contract enforcement. By introducing the notion of 
contract enforcement that stands for the probability of court to force the contract to be executed in 
case of the default of one of the parties from their obligations, they predict that contract insecurity 
reduces international trade. As there is a possibility of market failure better enforcement is 
beneficial to traders. In the context of international trade contracts should be enforced across 
countries. Enforcement will be at the level the home side permits it to be (Anderson & Young, 2006, 
1). Thus contract enforcement between two countries will be strong only if both of them agree on 
the level of enforcement and each take measures to ensure it. 
In the model risk neutral traders are randomly matched on the international market and transact one 
unit of the good in exchange for money. After agents have been matched, they start bargaining 
about the price on the spot market. The outside option for them is to sell the good at the home 
market, while bearing costs of returning the good back to the domestic market. There are costs to 
enter the international market and there exists an excess side of the market where agents do not find 
the matching pair. After entering the market trade costs are sunk and agents discover the random 
component of trade cost (𝜇𝑖; 𝑖 = 𝑠, 𝑏), that affects the ex post cost of returning home to make a deal, 
and decide whether to default and take the outside option.  Therefore, the existence of the random 
shocks makes default from contract preferable in some situations.  
In the case of a default the partner can appeal to court. The enforcement level is modeled by the 
probability that the defaulted contract will be enforced. As contract enforcement is imperfect, 
institutions sometimes do not punish the party that defaulted from the contract. Two situations are 
possible: the court will enforce the contract or the contract will be left unenforced. Only a portion θ 
of contracts in default will be enforced; θ ∈ [0,1]. And the probability that the contract will be 
executed is β = φ + θ (1 - φ); the price of the execution will be the contract price 𝑝𝑐. The parameter 
β varies positively with θ and represents the enforcement policy variable. Meaning that the higher 
the β is, the more powerful the institutions are in enforcing contracts.  
With an endogenously chosen enforcement, traders will want to have institutions that will support 
them in maximizing their economic returns. Thus, the sovereign nations will choose the strongest 
enforcement level (institutions) that will be supported by the traders from both countries.  
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The equilibrium match probability 
In order to see how better institutions influence trade we have to determine the equilibrium match 
probability. The match probability in the equilibrium is the probability that the contract will be 
executed. The higher the match probability is, the more contracts will be executed, thus the higher 
will be the trade volume. 
There will be either excess demand or excess supply on the market unless supply equals demand: 
s[p*–c] = d[b–p*], where p* is the expected bargaining price after the match, b and c are the prices 
in the domestic market in the case the agent was not matched and sells or buys at the home market. 
Considering the excess demand equilibrium, the probability for a buyer to make a random match is: 
 
π = 
(1− 𝛽)𝑠�𝑝𝑠�−𝑐�
𝑑�𝑏− 𝑝𝑏�−𝛽𝑠�𝑝𝑠�−𝑐�                                                                                                                             (1) 
 
Where 𝑝𝑏 is the price in excess demand equilibrium and 𝑝𝑠� is the expected price for the scarce side 
trader in excess demand equilibrium unconditional on default (in excess demand equilibrium the 
scarce side traders are represented by suppliers). The numerator on the right hand side is 
represented by the number of sellers active on the market, whose contracts are broken. The 
denominator is the number of the buyers active on the market that is the total number of buyers who 
wanted to trade minus those whose contracts are executed.  
To understand how the ability of institutions to enforce contracts influence trade volume, Anderson 
& Young (2000b) find the influence of the enforcement level β on the equilibrium match probability, 
by differentiating the RHS of (1) with respect to β using: 
 𝜕П
𝜕𝛽
 = ƒβ/ (1 - ƒπ) and obtain that ƒβ =�−(1 − 𝜋) + (1 −  𝛽 +  𝛽𝜋) 𝜀𝑆
𝑃𝑆�
𝜕𝑃𝑆�
𝜕𝛽
�
𝜋
1−𝛽
                                   (2) 
 𝜕𝑝
𝑠�
𝜕𝛽
=  𝑝𝑏 − 𝑝 ∗  +(1 −  𝜋)𝜇𝐷 = (1 −  𝜋)(𝑏 − 𝑝 ∗ + 𝜋𝐷) > 0,                                                       (3) 
(where  𝜀𝑆 ≡ 𝑝𝑠�s/s and 𝜇𝐷= E (𝜇𝑏|𝜇𝑏 <  𝜇 ∗𝑏 )) 
 
The first term under the brackets in (2) is negative and it shows the direct effect of increasing β on 
the match probability. It means that there are fewer sellers available due to increased number of 
binding contracts. The second term is positive and it can be interpreted as follows: with higher β the 
ratio of sellers to buyers becomes higher as the sellers expected price rises, increasing the 
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probability of a match. If sufficiently large elasticity of supply is assumed, the second effect is 
dominating and 𝜋 increases in β.   
It should be mentioned that there is an exception from the model when it includes parameters that 
stand for low stages of economic development. In this case there exists low enforcement 
equilibrium that is observed for developing countries. Low enforcement equilibrium is a trap for 
developing countries, as a better equilibrium is far away. 
The result of the model is that when contract enforcement is imperfect and assuming large price 
elasticity of supply, all traders prefer better enforcement as it increases their probability to be 
matched. As the probability of the match is increasing in contract enforcement it means that trade 
volume increases with the enforcement of the contracts by institutions, which means that better 
quality institutions encourage higher trade. A country with institutions of high quality is more likely 
to be able to better enforce the rule of law, hence ensuring a free, fair, and competitive market (Yu , 
2008, 2). Thus, it is important for the policymakers in the transition countries, Russia in particular, 
to recognize that markets’ success depends strongly on the adequate institutions. Often it is better to 
gradually build on available institutions, rather than creating replicas of the institution in the 
developed world from scratch (Dixit, 2004, 4). 
In order to show the relevance of the theoretical model for the empirical research in this thesis, the 
Author obtains the gravity equation from the model. In order to do that, the Author follows the idea 
by Anderson & Marcouiller (1999) that use the probability of the successful shipment between 
countries i and j to derive the gravity equation.  
The Author of the thesis obtains the following probability of the successful shipment between two 
countries from the model by Anderson & Young (2006): 
 
𝜋𝑖𝑗=𝜋𝑖𝜋𝑗 =  (1− 𝛽𝑖)𝑠�𝑝𝑠�−𝑐�𝑑�𝑏− 𝑝𝑏�−𝛽𝑖𝑠�𝑝𝑠�−𝑐� ∗ �1− 𝛽𝑗�𝑠�𝑝𝑠�−𝑐�𝑑�𝑏− 𝑝𝑏�−𝛽𝑗𝑠�𝑝𝑠�−𝑐� = (1− 𝛽𝑖)�1− 𝛽𝑗�𝑠�𝑝𝑠�−𝑐�𝑠�𝑝𝑠�−𝑐��𝑑�𝑏− 𝑝𝑏�−𝛽𝑖𝑠�𝑝𝑠�−𝑐���𝑑�𝑏− 𝑝𝑏�−𝛽𝑗𝑠�𝑝𝑠�−𝑐�� = 
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𝑑�𝑏− 𝑝𝑏�
𝑠�𝑝𝑠�−𝑐�
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𝑠�𝑝𝑠�−𝑐�
−𝛽𝑗�
= 1− 𝛽𝑗− 𝛽𝑖+𝛽𝑗𝛽𝑖
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−𝛽𝑗�
= 𝛽𝑖𝛽𝑗�1+ 1𝛽𝑖𝛽𝑗 − 1𝛽𝑖  − 1𝛽𝑗�
�
𝑑�𝑏− 𝑝𝑏�
𝑠�𝑝𝑠�−𝑐�
−𝛽𝑖��
𝑑�𝑏− 𝑝𝑏�
𝑠�𝑝𝑠�−𝑐�
−𝛽𝑗�
 ;                                  (4) 
 
Assume costs are represented by D, which is the distance between the two countries: 
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𝐷 ≡  �1+ 1𝛽𝑖𝛽𝑗 − 1𝛽𝑖  − 1𝛽𝑗�
�
𝑑�𝑏− 𝑝𝑏�
𝑠�𝑝𝑠�−𝑐�
−𝛽𝑖��
𝑑�𝑏− 𝑝𝑏�
𝑠�𝑝𝑠�−𝑐�
−𝛽𝑗�
                                                                                                               (5) 
 
As the enforcement will be at the level the home side (importer country) permits it to be (Anderson 
& Young, 2006, 1), contract enforcement will be at the level of the importing country 𝛽𝑖. Thus 𝛽𝑗 
will be at the level of 𝛽𝑖 in the term D (𝛽𝑗 = 𝛽𝑖): 
𝐷 ≡  �1+ 1𝛽𝑖2 − 2𝛽𝑖2  �
�
𝑑�𝑏− 𝑝𝑏�
𝑠�𝑝𝑠�−𝑐�
−𝛽𝑖�
2                                                                                                                                (6) 
 
Thus, the expression for  𝜋𝑖𝑗 is: 
𝜋𝑖𝑗=𝜋𝑖𝜋𝑗=𝛽𝑖𝛽𝑗𝐷, where   𝐷 ≡  �1+1−2𝛽𝑖2𝛽𝑖2  �
�
𝑑�𝑏− 𝑝𝑏�
𝑠�𝑝𝑠�−𝑐�
−𝛽𝑖�
2 .                                                                                     (7) 
 
The obtained result is comparable to the gravity equation obtained by Anderson and Marcouiller 
(1999, 6). The probability of successful shipment 𝜋𝑖𝑗 can be reflected by a price markup on imports 
by country i from country j. The price markup at the same time influences import demand as import 
demand depends on these prices (Anderson and Marcouiller 1999, 6-8). Thus, the term 𝜋𝑖𝑗 can be 
proxied by the import of country i from country j. 𝛽𝑖 and 𝛽𝑗 stand for the quality of institutions, the 
quality is the higher, the higher is the probability of contract enforcement. D is the distance between 
the two countries. The main idea of the obtained gravity equation is that the volume of trade 
depends on the strength of the institutions to enforce contract in the two countries and the distance 
between the two countries.  
4.2 Impact of institutions on trade: empirical evidence  
Only a few empirical studies measure the importance of institutions for trade. Anderson & 
Marcouiller (2002) concluded that corruption and imperfect contract enforcement dramatically 
reduced international trade. By estimating the gravity equation they found out that insecurity caused 
by imperfect institutions reduced import demand in a same way as hidden tax. Inadequate 
institutions influence trade as much as tariffs do. Insecurity of trade, such as lack of mechanism to 
enforce contracts, bribes by custom officials and possibility of hijack, can be represented as hidden 
transactions costs that reduce the amount of trade. On the one hand, trade is reduced in the presence 
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of imperfect institutions because the traders have to increase prices in order to cover for the costs 
that they face due to insecurity. On the other hand, when there exist courts, tax collection agencies 
and bureaucracies, which enforce contracts and protect property rights for secure exchange, 
transactions costs are lowered for the trading partners leading to the increase of international trade 
volume. Büge (2010) showed, by using such empirical methods as OLS, Poisson and IV, that trade 
insecurity influenced the degree of uncertainty of economic agents, as trade costs caused by bribes, 
extortion, or theft were much less predictable. According to empirical evidence an improvement by 
10 % of the quality of institutions and lowering the degree of uncertainty would increase trade by 
3,8 % (Büge, 2010, 22). Nunn (2007, 570) found that countries, where institutions were able to 
support good contract enforcement, specialized in industries with the importance of relationship-
specific investments. Patterns of trade between countries could be explained more by contract 
enforcement than countries’ endowments of physical capital and skilled labor combined. 
The research done by Berkowitz et al. (2006) complemented the one done by Anderson & 
Marcouiller (2002) and stated that good institutions of the importer influenced trade by lowering the 
predation risk. Furthermore they concluded that good institutions in the exporter’s country could 
boost international trade, especially trade in complex products, because they minimized exporter’s 
incentive to violate contracts. The conclusions by Berkowitz et al. (2006) had an important 
implication that political actors could indirectly influence trade flows by improving institutions. 
Following the study by Berkowitz et al. (2006), Ma et al. (2011) researched how institutional 
quality affected exports at a firm level in developing and transition countries and provided evidence, 
by using Tobit and IV methods, that better institutions resulted in higher exports of complex goods. 
As Russia is the focus of this thesis, it makes sense to look at the example of a country with 
comparable structure of economy to understand future prospects for Russia after the WTO 
accession. China, that became the WTO member in 2001, is a good benchmark as it also has an 
emerging market and is a member of the BRICS that includes the countries with similar type of 
influence in the international political and economic system (Armijo, 2007, 9). Yu (2008), by 
estimating the gravity equation and using OLS, PPML and IV methods, found that the main reason 
of China´s trade increase after joining the WTO was the influence of the WTO on the quality of 
institutions.  
Other countries, that can be a possible benchmark, are the Eastern European countries and the CIS 
countries. Schuler (2003) researched the impact of institutions on trade for Eastern Europe and the 
former Soviet Union countries. He provided evidence that weak institutions were the reason of low 
exports of complex goods in the former Soviet Union countries and Eastern Europe during the early 
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years of transition. Schuler stated that weak institutions were the obstacle to the investments in the 
skilled labor intensive industries in the transition countries. Thus, they prevented those countries 
from exploring competitive advantage and benefiting from trade. In the research done by Babecká 
Kucharčuková O. et al (2012, 295) low institutional quality in the CIS countries denoted the biggest 
obstacle to higher trade volumes. Quality of institutions was more important for trade than 
geographical disadvantages resulting from distance to major markets. They assumed that the WTO 
membership could improve trade volumes in the CIS and trade increase would be reinforced in case 
of institutional improvement.  
In conclusion, both theory and empirical evidence show that weak institutions represent significant 
and quantitatively large barriers to trade. According to empirical evidence for several countries 
better functioning institutions facilitated the increase of bilateral trade flows. Therefore, it can be 
assumed that the improvement of Russian institutions will as well increase its trade.  
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5 Gravity Model and Methodology 
This part of the thesis concentrates on explaining the gravity model that is used in the empirical 
part. First, the gravity model and the theory it is based on is explained. Second, the particular 
gravity equation used for this thesis is presented. Third, the motivation for the choice of the 
empirical methods is described. 
5.1 Gravity Model 
The gravity model of trade has long been one of the most successful empirical models in 
economics. The model works well empirically, explaining a large part of the variation in bilateral 
trade, by estimating bilateral trade flows to GDP, distance and other factors that affect trade 
barriers. The gravity equation states that the product of two countries GDP’s is directly proportional 
to the trade between them. The gravity model predicts that larger countries are more likely to trade 
more with each other, and countries with comparable sizes will also tend to have more trade with 
one another (Feenstra, 2003). With higher levels of GDP and lower transaction costs, measured as 
distance between the countries, trade flows will be higher. Anderson & Wincoop (2003, 171) state 
that if resistance to trade between the country and the rest of the world is observed, the country 
trades more with a given bilateral partner. This can be explained by the fact that a bilateral barrier 
between two regions influences trade less than the average barrier of the two regions with all their 
partners. Evenett et al. (2002) believe that perfect specialization accounts for the success of the 
gravity equation to predict variation in bilateral trade flows between two countries.  
The gravity model has a long history of use. Ravenstein (1889) was the first one to implement 
gravity for migration patterns in the 19th century. Tinbergen (1962) was first to use the equation to 
explain trade flows. Since then the gravity model has been used by mane researchers to estimate 
trade flow effects of customs unions, exchange rate mechanisms, ethnic ties, linguistic identity and 
international borders.  
The traditional gravity model predicted the movement of goods between two countries similar to the 
Newton's Law of Gravitation. The supply of goods from country of origin is attracted to the demand 
for goods at the country of destination, but the distance between countries reduces the potential flow 
(Anderson 2011, 2). Later the traditional gravity model, which was based only on two variables, 
was improved by adding other proxies for trade frictions, such as the influence of geographic 
distance, common border, official language, regional trade agreement, religion and colonial history 
(Linders & Groot 2006, 3). 
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The standard model has a challenge with zero-valued bilateral trade flows. Most of the studies 
ignore zero flows in the analysis of bilateral trade. This results in neglecting important information 
for understanding the patterns of bilateral trade (Linders & Groot, 2006, 3). 
Since the gravity equation was first derived, the economists have shown that the same equation can 
be obtained from different trade theories (Filippini & Molini, 2003). Anderson (1979) was one of 
the first to develop a theoretical framework to derive the gravity equation. He provided a model that 
determined trade flows by the demand side, assuming complete specialization of countries. 
Deardorff (1998) showed that the demand side model by Anderson (1979) was compatible with the 
classical/neoclassical and new trade theory. Eaton & Kortum (2002) assumed that the levels of 
technology differed by country and derived the gravity equation based on the Ricardian trade model 
with a continuum of goods. Chaney (2008) and Melitz & Ottaviano (2008) obtained the gravity 
equation from the new-new trade theory that focused on the importance of the firm, not the 
countries in international trade (Ciuriak, 2011). 
As mentioned previously, different international trade theories lead to the same gravity equation. In 
this thesis the generalized gravity model is derived from the demand side model specifying the 
expenditure function of the consumers to be a Constant Elasticity of Substitution (CES) function 
used by Anderson (2011) and Anderson & Wincoop (2003). In the demand side model exogenous 
supply of goods is assumed for countries.  Countries produce fixed quantity of a unique bundle of 
goods (Ruiz & Vilarrubia, 2007, 12). In this case only the demand of the target country influences 
trade flows. 
The consumer in the importer country (country i) maximizes the following utility function 
(Anderson & Wincoop, 2003, 177): 
 𝑈 (𝑥𝑒𝑖𝑡) =  (∑ 𝛽𝑒𝑡1−𝜎𝜎𝑒 𝑥𝑒𝑖𝑡𝜎−1𝜎 ) 𝜎𝜎−1  , with 𝜎 > 1                                                                                    (8) 
 
 
Subject to the budget constraint:   
∑ 𝑝𝑒𝑖𝑡𝑥𝑒𝑖𝑡𝑒 =  𝑦𝑖𝑡                                                                        (9) 
 
Where 𝑥𝑒𝑖𝑡 are country e exports to country i in period t, 𝛽𝑒
1−𝜎
𝜎 is the number of goods produced by 
country e, 𝜎 represents the elasticity of substitution between goods from different countries, 𝑝𝑒𝑖𝑡 is 
the c.i.f. import price from country e to country i at time t and 𝑦𝑖𝑡is the nominal income of country i 
at time t. With the presence of transportation costs country e´s export price becomes  𝑝𝑒𝑖𝑡=𝑝𝑒𝑡·𝑡𝑒𝑖𝑡 
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where 𝑝𝑒𝑡is the export producer price and (𝑡𝑒𝑖𝑡–1) is the amount lost to shipping, interpreted as 
trade costs. 
By solving the optimization an import demand equation is obtained: 
𝑥𝑒𝑖𝑡 =  𝑦𝑖𝑡 �𝛽𝑒𝑡𝑝𝑒𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑖𝑡𝑃𝑖𝑡 �1−𝜎                                                                                                                  (10) 
 
where 𝑃𝑖𝑡 is the price index of the country i at time t: 
𝑃𝑖𝑡 =  (∑ (𝛽𝑒𝑡𝑃𝑒𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑖𝑡)1−𝜎𝑒 ) 11−𝜎                                                                                                           (11) 
 
 
By introducing market clearance (𝑦𝑒𝑡 =  ∑ 𝑥𝑒𝑖𝑡𝑖 ) and noting 𝑦𝑤𝑡 as the world income, the structural 
gravity model can be obtained, showing bilateral trade flow for countries e and i: 
𝑥𝑒𝑖𝑡 =  𝑦𝑒𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑤𝑡 � 𝑡𝑒𝑖𝑡𝑃𝑒𝑡𝑃𝑖𝑡�1−𝜎         (12) 
 
In equation (12)  𝑃𝑒𝑡  and  𝑃𝑖𝑡 are outward and inward multilateral resistance terms, that aggregate 
bilateral trade costs and decompose their influence on the producers and the consumers. Outward 
multilateral resistances are understood as if the sellers in each country shipped to a single world 
market and inward multilateral resistances as if there was a single world market for the buyers to 
import from (Olivero & Yotov, 2012, 71).  
The equation (12) cannot be empirically estimated as the multilateral resistance terms are not 
observable. Anderson & Wincoop (2003) suggest estimating (12) with non-linear methods by 
expressing 𝑃𝑒𝑡 and 𝑃𝑖𝑡 as non-linear combinations of 𝑦𝑖𝑡, 𝑦𝑒𝑡, and 𝑡𝑒𝑖𝑡, or replacing these terms with 
fixed country effects. ln teit can be assumed to be a bilateral trade barrier (Hornok, 2012, 5). In this 
thesis bilateral trade barrier is represented by the weighted distance between countries, as it reduces 
trade due to the increasing transaction costs and may lead to greater risk of misappropriation of 
goods during shipment. 
In this thesis the gravity model specification by Lissovolik & Lissovolik (2006) will be used and 
additional independent variables necessary for the estimation will be included.  Two separate 
gravity equations will be estimated: for Russian export and Russian import in order to compare how 
the quality of institutions influence Russian export and import separately. Most gravity models have 
a multilateral setup, while only Russia’s pairwise trade with other countries will be investigated in 
this thesis. According to Lissovolik & Lissovolik (2006, 11) the country-centered specification 
allows to focus on idiosyncratic patterns of Russia’s foreign trade through a more precise modeling 
of the country-specific parameters.  
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The specific form of the equation that will be estimated is the following: 
 
𝑙𝑛𝑋𝑟𝑢𝑠(𝑖) = 𝑙𝑛𝐷𝑖 + ln(𝑌𝑟𝑢𝑠 ∗  𝑌𝑖) + ln(𝑦𝑟𝑢𝑠 ∗  𝑦𝑖) + 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑏𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑟 + 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑢𝑎𝑔𝑒 +                (13)                      +  𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑠 + 𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖                                                                                      
               
Where 𝑋𝑟𝑢𝑠(𝑖) stands for Russian exports to country i or country i's export to Russia2
4.1
; 𝐷𝑖  is the 
weighted distance between Russia and country i; the two following terms denote the products of 
Russia’s and partner’s GDPs and GDPs per capita respectively. Comborder and Comlanguage are 
the dummy variables that capture if Russia’s trading partner shares a border or has the same 
language as Russia. As it was shown in the theoretical model in Chapter , it is important to 
include in the gravity model the institutional variables, both for the country of interest and its 
partner. Therefore, the variables for the quality of the Russian institutions and Partner institutions,  
𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑠 and 𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖 respectively are included. 
In conclusion, the specific form of the gravity equation that is used in the empirical part of this 
thesis is comparable to the one derived in the theoretical part (Chapter 4.1). In both cases the level 
of import (or export) depends on the distance between the two countries and the quality of their 
institutions. The gravity equation in the theoretical part has a shorter form, while the one used for 
the empirical part contains several additional variables that are usually included in the gravity 
equation. It should be noticed that the model in the theoretical part assumes large price elasticity of 
supply, while supply is completely inelastic in the model above. This difference is negligible 
because different trade theories lead to the same gravity equation, as it was discussed previously. 
Therefore, the form of the equation described above will not change in case the assumption of 
inelastic supply is dropped. 
5.2 Methodology 
The aim of this thesis is to study how Russia’s own institutions and its partners’ institutions 
influence its trade, and to answer the main question whether the increase of the quality of Russian 
institutions, encouraged by the WTO membership, will increase its trade flows. This section 
describes possible problems that may arise in the empirical model and introduces methods that are 
used to obtain proper estimations.                                                          
2   As Import data is estimated in CIF, and export data is estimated in FOB, in order to obtain comparable results for 
Russian export and import I use only export data (export data from Russia to its partners and export data from 
Russian partners to Russia) 
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5.2.1 Missing trade problem 
According to the empirical papers, discussed in the Chapter 2, that assess the influence of the WTO 
on trade, missing trade problem is a very important issue that should be carefully considered in 
order to obtain proper results. The recent papers, like Roy (2011), Liu (2009), state that not 
controlling for the zero trade flows may lead to biased results. 
Most of the studies assessing the impact of the WTO on Russian trade do not pay special attention 
to this problem. Babecká Kucharčuková (2004), Brock (2006) and Kolesnikov & Podkorytova 
(2011)  do not address the issue of zero trade at all, Lissovolik & Lissovolik (2006) transform the 
data in various ways: by adding 1 to the number under the logarithm and by assigning negligible 
values to the missing observations.  
Silva & Tenreyro (2006, 653) argue that standard empirical methods of estimating the gravity 
equation, such as OLS (Ordinary Least Squares), are inappropriate. Log-linearization in the 
standard methods is incompatible with the data containing zeros as zero-trade pairs are eliminated 
in those methods. In order to avoid significant bias of the OLS estimation Silva & Tenreyro (2006) 
introduce a Poisson Pseudo Maximum Likelihood (PPML) estimator that does not require taking a 
logarithm from the dependent variable. According to Fratianni et al. (2010) in the presence of 
country and year fixed effects and country-pair random effects and a large number of zero-values in 
the dataset it is optimal to use PPML. Even if there is a large proportion of zeros in the data it does 
not affect the performance of the PPML estimator (Silva & Tenreyro, 2011, 222).  
To define the PPML estimator Tenreyro (2007) uses the gravity equation in its exponential form:  
 
 𝑇𝑖𝑗 = exp�𝑥𝑖𝑗𝛽� + 𝜀𝑖𝑗                                                                    (14)   
 
where the vector 𝑥𝑖𝑗   consists of explanatory variables (some of which may be linear, some in 
logarithms and some dummy variables (Martin & Pham, 2008, 8)). If 𝐸�𝜀𝑖𝑗�𝑥� = 0, the PPML 
estimator is represented by: 
 
𝛽 � = arg max𝑏 ∑ �𝑇𝑖𝑗 ∗ �𝑥𝑖𝑗𝑏� − exp (𝑥𝑖𝑗𝑏)�𝑛𝑖,𝑗                                                                               (15) 
 
Implying the set of first order conditions: 
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∑ �𝑇𝑖𝑗 − exp (𝑥𝑖𝑗𝛽�)�𝑥𝑖𝑗𝑛𝑖,𝑗 = 0                                                                                                          (16)  
 
For the estimator to be consistent the correct specification of the conditional mean is required, that 
is,  𝐸�𝑇𝑖𝑗�𝑥𝑖𝑗� = exp(𝑥𝑖𝑗 𝛽).  Therefore, this estimator is similar to a Generalized Method of 
Moments (GMM) estimator that solves moment conditions in equation (16). The PPML identifies 
the coefficients using the same first-order conditions used by the maximum-likelihood estimator 
derived from the Poisson distribution (Fally, 2012, 8). But for the estimator based on the Poisson 
likelihood function to be consistent, the data do not have to correspond to Poisson properties and 
𝑇𝑖𝑗  does not have to be an integer (Silva & Tenreyro, 2006, 645).  
Because there is a considerable amount of zero observations in the data used for this thesis, and as 
the zero trade problem was not specifically addressed in the research for the Russian trade, the 
PPML estimator, described above, is an appropriate estimation method for this thesis. 
5.2.2 Endogeneity of institutions 
When estimating the influence of institutions on trade, reverse causality should be considered. 
Dollar and Kray (2003) argue that the relationship between trade and institutions is bidirectional. 
Improved quality of institutions can result in more trade while at the same time trade increase may 
encourage improvement of institutions. The unaddressed problem of the endogeneity of the 
institutions may lead to obtaining biased estimates. In order to prevent such bias Instrumental 
Variable (IV) method is used in this thesis.  
According to Nichols (2007) the Instrumental variable method introduces another set of variables z 
correlated with 𝑥𝑇 but not correlated with the error term, e.g. 𝜀 in  
 
𝑦 =  𝑥𝑇𝛽𝑇 +  𝑥𝐶𝛽𝐶 + 𝜀       (17) 
 
The set of instruments z should satisfy following conditions: 𝐸(𝑧´𝜀) = 0 and 𝐸(𝑧´𝑥𝑇) ≠ 0. With 
such specifications of the instruments it is possible to estimate the impact of 𝑥𝑇 on y.  
It is important to mention that the IV estimations are only as good as the instruments used. Good 
instrument should correlate with the variable and not correlate with the variable’s error term. In case 
of this thesis, the instruments for institutional variables should have an impact on institutions, but 
not directly influence bilateral trade levels. The instruments that will be discussed below were 
 29  
chosen as they proved to be appropriate instruments in several papers assessing the quality of 
institutions. The quality of the instruments will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 7.3.1. 
Researchers usually include several estimation methods for the same database as each method has 
its advantages and disadvantages and it cannot be asserted that any one of them absolutely 
outperforms the others. In this thesis three methods will be used: OLS, IV and PPML.  
Postestimation tests will be performed in Chapter 7.3 in order to compare those methods.  
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6 Variables and Data 
This chapter describes the panel data used in this thesis. The data consists of country pairs and years 
in the estimation. The dataset consist of 197 Russian partners for export (import) for 12 years 
(2000-2011), with some countries excluded due to poor data availability. The zero observations 
were kept for PPML estimations. As the availability of data differs for export and imports, there is 
different amount of zeros present in the export and import data. 
The data is collected from several sources. The trade data was collected from the United Nations 
Commodity Trade Statistics Database. The Data on the GDP and the GDP per capita was collected 
from UNCTAD database. The data for institutional variables was obtained from The Worldwide 
Governance Indicators (WGI). The data on dummy variables, distance, instrumental variables was 
collected from diverse sources. The data was obtained as the currency of the United States and 
deflated in the prices of the year 2005. 
6.1 Variables 
In this chapter general gravity model variables are described, such as trade flows, distance and 
GDP, as well as institutional variables, instrumental variables and additional variables. 
Common gravity equation variables 
Export The dependent variable is characterized by the natural logarithm of exports from country of 
origin to the country of destination. In contrast, the regressand for the Poisson Pseudo Maximum 
Likelihood (PPML) estimator is in levels, and not in logarithms. Although the mean is still specified 
in the logarithm form, i.e. the logarithm of the mean is linear in the variables. The nominal data on 
Exports in American dollars is obtained from United Nations Commodity Trade Statistics Database. 
The data in the database is available in different classifications. For this thesis the total amount of 
export from one country to another is taken from the dataset, classifying the data by Broad 
Economic Categories (BEC), as this classification is suitable for the general economic analysis of 
international trade data (OECD, 27.01.2013). To obtain the real values of exports, the Author uses 
Consumer price index (CPI, 2005 = 100), following Yu (2010, 293). The data on CPI is obtained 
from the World Bank Development Indicators.  
Product of real GDPs Real GDP is one of the main variables in the gravity equation. It is expected 
that there will be positive effect of GDPs on bilateral trade, because the idea behind it is that higher 
income countries are likely to trade more with each other (Khatibi, 2008, 3). The levels of the 
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countries GDP’s should affect positively their bilateral trade. The data for the GDP (in constant US 
dollars, base year 2005) was obtained from the UNCTAD database. 
Product of real GDPs per capita (GDPcap) GDP per capita is usually included to measure the 
influence of the level of the country’s development on trade. The data for the GDP per capita (in 
constant US dollars, base year 2005) was obtained from UNCTAD database. 
Distance As Russia has a big territory simple distance estimation that is taking into account only 
the distance between capitals cannot be used. Instead it is preferred to use weighted distances, for 
which the data on principal cities in each country is taken into account. CEPII’s distances measures 
were used to estimate the distance. The weighted distance measure takes into consideration the 
geographic distribution of population inside each nation. The general formula for calculating 
distance between countries i and j presented by Mayer &Zignago (2011, 11) is: 
 
𝑑𝑖𝑗 =  �∑ (𝑝𝑜𝑝𝑘 𝑝𝑜𝑝𝑖⁄ )∑ �𝑝𝑜𝑝𝑙 𝑝𝑜𝑝𝑗⁄ �𝑑𝑘𝑙𝜃𝑙 ∈𝑖𝑘 ∈𝑖 �1 𝜃�                                                                      (18) 
 
where 𝑝𝑜𝑝𝑘  is the population agglomeration k belonging to country i. Parameter 𝜃 measures the 
sensitivity of trade flows to bilateral distance 𝑑𝑘𝑙. It is set to equal to -1, which corresponds to the 
usual coefficient estimated from gravity models of bilateral trade flows. 
Some studies include exchange rate volatility as a variable in the gravity equation. It is not included 
in this thesis as according to Tenreyro (2007, 485) exchange rate variability has no significant 
impact on trade flows. Maurel (2004) provided justifications of the ambiguous impact of exchange 
rate volatility on trade. 
As stated by Anderson & Marcouiller (2002, 344) it is important to consider if the trade partners 
share a common border or a common language, because those factors may improve the exporter’s 
skill in using the institutions of the importing country to protect the shipments.  
Common language It can be assumed that transaction costs for countries with same language will 
be lower (Bussière & Schnatz, 2006, 13). Usually the official language data is used to estimate the 
gravity equation, but according to the recent study by Egger & Lassmann (2012, 224) there is a big 
discrepancy between the results of the equation if the official or the spoken language is used. For 
the case of Russia, the Author believes that the results will be more precise if spoken language is 
used as in most former USSR countries there is a significant share of population speaking Russian 
language, although it is not official in those countries. The information on common language is 
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taken from the CIA World Factbook. The language variable is 1 if the countries share the same 
language and 0 otherwise. 
Common Border The international border significantly affects transaction costs. If trading partners 
share a common border they are expected to trade more (Ghemawata et al, 2010, 420). The 
information for this variable is obtained from the CIA World Fact book. The dummy gets value 1 if 
Russia shares a common border with a country and 0 otherwise. 
Institutional variables  
The quality of the institutions cannot be directly observed. The only possibility to assess institutions 
is to use objective data such as the quantity of officially reported cases of corruption or the 
frequency of the government changes (Büge, 2010, 8). Indicators that represent a numerical 
illustration of complex phenomena are a good tool to use when an unobservable complex 
phenomena needs to be given a simpler and more comparable form (Davis et al, 2012, 8). In this 
thesis institutions are measured based on several institutional scores, obtained from The Worldwide 
Governance Indicators (WGI).  
The Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) are provided by the World Bank and show the 
quality of governance based on the view of large number of enterprise, citizen and expert survey 
respondents in industrial and developing countries. According to Belke et al. (2009, 7) WGI is the 
most comprehensive measure of institutional development calculated for international comparisons.  
The Rule of law represents a system where the government is accountable under the law, laws are 
stable and fair, the processes enforcing the law are efficient and justice is delivered by competent 
independent representatives3
With the two other indexes it is possible to evaluate the quality of administration in the country and 
to estimate whether the government is capable of formulating sound policies. They are chosen for 
this thesis as they represent the most relevant governance dimensions (Daude & Stein, 2007, 329). 
. The Rule of law indicator is a good benchmark for the quality of 
institutions as it shows the confidence of the agents that the rules of law are followed in society, 
particularly the quality of contract enforcement, protection of property rights and the efficiency of 
courts. 
The Regulatory quality index shows the perception of the citizens of the ability of the government 
to implement proper policies and regulations that encourage economic development.  
                                                         
3  See: The World Justice Project. What is the rule of law? Available at: http://worldjusticeproject.org/what-rule-law 
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Government effectiveness index describes the perception of the quality of public and civil services, 
their independence from political pressure and the trust of the economic agents that the government 
will commit to the policies. 
All the indexes described above are rescaled to range from 0 to 10, with 10 being most desirable 
situation. As better institutions encourage trade, the correlation between the quality of institutions 
measures and trade flows is anticipated to be positive. According to Kaufmann et al (2010, 4) the 
indexes are interdependent as they measure similar areas of the institutional quality. In order to 
avoid possible correlation between the variables, the Author follows Babecká Kucharčuková O. et 
al (2012) and takes the arithmetic average of the described indexes to obtain the institutional 
variables for Russia and for its partners. 
Instrumental variables 
Infant mortality rate is the annual number of deaths of infants under age 1 per 1,000 live births. It 
defines the probability of dying between birth and exactly one year of age during the period 2000-
2005. The infant mortality rate is an appropriate instrumental variable as the mortality rate in a 
country is highly correlated with the institutional quality but weakly correlated with trade (Yu, 
2008, 16). The data on the infant mortality rate is obtained from the United Nations World 
Population Prospects.  
ELF The index of ethnolinguistic fractionalization measures the likelihood that two persons drawn 
randomly from a country’s population will not belong to the same ethnolinguistic group. This index 
was first used by Mauro (1995) to control for endogeneity in the research of the influence of 
corruption on economic growth. Later it was used by Faruq (2011) to assess the influence of 
institutions on export quality. When different ethnolinguistic groups are present in the country 
political tensions may occur between them. This may result in more corruption and unnecessary 
regulations by bureaucrats to favor their own ethnolinguistic groups. The ELF variable contains the 
ELF index for partner countries. It is not expected to be directly related to exports, which makes it 
an appropriate instrument for institutional quality. The information on the index is obtained from 
Roeder (2001).  
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6.2 Descriptive analysis of the data 
In this part overall characteristics of the data are gone through. Table 4 below represents the 
characteristics of the whole dataset with separate information on Russian exports and imports.  
Table 4: Descriptive statistics of variables (2000-2011)   
 
Variable 
Import Export 
Obs. Mean Std. Dev Min  Max Obs. Mean Std. Dev Min  Max 
Import 
(Export) 
2388
  
7,36e+08 2,81e+09 0 4,73e+10 2388     
 
1,60e+09     6,04e+09           0 1,08e+11 
Log Import 
(Export) 
1463 17,293 4,025  3,095 24,581 2064      17,389     3,861  0,487    25,406 
Log 
Distance 
2388
  
8,589 0,684 6,754 9,650 2388      
 
8,589  0,684 6,754   9,650 
Log pr. 
Real GDP 
2264
  
23,113 2,440 16,635 30,162 2264     23,113  2,440  16,635  30,162 
Log pr. real 
per capita 
GDP 
2252
 
  
16,711 1,677 13,024
  
20,170 2252     
 
16,711  1,677    13,024   20,170 
Common 
border 
2388
  
0,070 0,256 0 1 2388      0,070     0,255         0 1 
Common 
language 
2388
  
0,061 0,239 0 1 2388     0,060  0,238           0 1 
Institutions 
Russia 
2388
  
3,813 0,322 2,94 4,094 2388     3,813 0,322      2,94    4,094 
Institutions 
Partner 
1784
  
4,989 1,950 0,027 9,180 1784     4,989  1,950 0,027  9,180 
 
According to the information obtained from Table 4, we can see that there is a considerable amount 
of zero observations (39% for import and 14% for export). That means that the PPML estimator 
may be more efficient than OLS in this case, as zero observations are not lost in the PPML method. 
The big amount of zeros can be explained, first, by the large amount of countries that are considered 
in this thesis, including small countries that might not trade with Russia for certain periods of time, 
second, by the fact that the data was obtained from one source and in one classification. The reason 
for using only one source is to obtain comparable, trustworthy results. The United Nations 
Commodity Trade Statistics Database is a good choice as it is considered the most comprehensive 
trade database available with more than 1 billion records. 
Table 4 makes it clear, that Russian export is higher than Russian import. Figure 1 below represents 
the development of Russian total real export and real import in millions of dollars in more detail.  
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Figure 1 Development of Russian export and import (calculated by the Author) 
As it can be observed from Figure 1, Russia is a net exporter country, with its export higher than its 
import in all the years. Overall, both export and import of Russia display increasing trends over the 
years 2000–2011. Otherwise smooth development of the trade flows has a peak in 2008 and a fall in 
2009. The reason for the increase of export in 2008 was the favorable situation on the world market 
of mineral resources. Because mineral resources constitute a big part of Russian export, the 
favorable situation on the market led to an increase of Russia's share in the world exports from 1,05% 
in 2000 to 2,9% in 2008, however, a sharp decline in energy prices, noted in 2009, led to a 
reduction in this percentage to 2,17%. The import growth before the global financial crisis was 
caused by the demand growth in the domestic market and, hence, the increase in the physical 
volume of goods bought from abroad (Merkulov, 2012). 
As stated in Table 4, the average quality of Russian institutions during the years 2000-2011 has 
been lower than the average quality of the Partners’ institutions. This shows the potential for the 
quality increase of the Russian institutions. Figure 2 shows how Russian institutions were 
developing in time. As European institutions will be used later in this thesis, as a benchmark of the 
increase in quality of the Russian institutions, Figure 2 presents as well the development of the 
average quality of the institutions in the EU. 
 
Figure 2 Development of Russian and EU institutions (calculated by the Author) 
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Figure 2 shows a rather steady development of institutions over time with Russian institutions being 
a bit more volatile due to the fact that the score for the EU institutions is the average score for the 
EU countries. A drop in the quality of institutions is seen in the year 2001. The changes over time 
of the WGI indicators, that were used to construct institutional variables, reflect a combination of 
three factors: the changes in the underlying source data, the addition of new data sources that are 
only available in the more recent period, and the changes in the weights used to aggregate the 
individual sources. Therefore, the drop in 2001 is most probably due to one of those factors. It is 
important to mention that the changes in the indicator over short year-to-year periods are difficult to 
measure with any kind of data, and are typically quite small.  Therefore, it is recommended not 
focus on short-run year-to-year changes but rather on trends over longer periods, such as a decade 
(Worldwide governance indicators, 20.09.2012) 
The fact that institutional variables vary little over time, as it is seen in Figure 2, has been a concern 
of several researchers. Therefore, Baccaro & Rei (2007) suggested using averaged data over the 
years. The drawback of this approach is that averaging the data does not allow to see short term 
effects. Moreover, they found that the results of the estimations with annual data were largely 
similar to those obtained with five-year averages. Another concern with the institutional variables 
that do not vary sufficiently over time is the use of the fixed effects method. Thus, Prakash & 
Potoski (2006, 358) as well as Beck & Katz (2001, 493) stated that the fixed effect approach had 
sufficient drawbacks when it was used to observe the influence of institutions and democracy on the 
dependent variable. 
For this thesis, it should be taken into consideration that the institutional variables, varying little 
over time, are likely to produce coefficient estimates that will vary the most across different 
estimation methods (Baccaro & Rei, 2007). Therefore, the coefficients should be interpreted with 
attention paid to this fact. The institutional variables used in this thesis are obtained by taking an 
arithmetic mean of three different indexes. This may result in the institutional variable varying even 
less over time than the separate indexes, making the problem of little variation worse. In order to 
justify for the averaging of the indexes in this thesis, the indexes are included in the equation one at 
a time and the first stage of the IV method is performed to see if one of those variables works better. 
The results of the estimation are discussed in Chapter 7.2. 
To conclude, the simple analysis of the data is not enough to establish the relationship between 
trade and the Institutional variables. It is required to use more complicated empirical methods that 
are described in the following chapter.   
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7 Empirical results 
This chapter starts with the discussion of the estimation procedures that were used to choose more 
appropriate econometric methods. Then the results of the empirical estimations are presented with 
special attention on the impact of Partner and Russian institutions on Russian trade, followed by 
additional post estimation tests that help to understand which empirical model describes the data 
better.  
7.1 General empirical results  
The empirical estimation is started with a simple OLS regression and performing post estimation 
tests on it in order to understand the data better. First, the model is checked for heteroskedasticity, 
because if the errors are heteroskedastic it cannot be expected that the model will provide unbiased 
estimates of mean effects. The OLS method makes the assumption that variance of the error term is 
constant, 𝑉�𝜀𝑗� = 𝜎2  for all j. If the error terms do not have constant variance, they are 
heteroskedastic. When the standard errors are biased, a bias in test statistics and confidence 
intervals occurs.  
Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test is used in this thesis to test for heteroskedasticity. The null 
hypothesis is that the error variances are all equal, and an alternative hypothesis that the error 
variances increase (or decrease) as the predicted values of the dependent variable increase. A large 
chi-square for both exports and imports (329, 293 respectively) and a high significance of the both 
test statistics (p=0,0000) indicate the presence of heteroskedasticity. This result is common in the 
gravity equation analysis, as the data sample usually consists of bilateral trade flows collected from 
multiple countries, which naturally gives ground to heteroskedasticity (Xiong & Chen, 2012, 3). In 
general, heteroskedasticity is less a concern as long as the model is correctly specified, because it 
does not undermine the consistency of estimates. 
In order to deal with heteroskedasticity OLS and IV regressions with robust standard errors are used 
in this thesis. As it was shown by Silva &Tenreyro (2006, 641) PPML method is robust to the 
different patterns of heteroskedasticity because it estimates the dependent variable in levels and not 
in logarithms. 
Another concern is the possible presence of multicollinearity. Multicollinearity occurs when the 
predictor variables in the regression are highly correlated with one another. When this happens, 
standard errors become inflated, making the coefficients unreliable. The obtained coefficients can 
be highly sensitive to the particular model specification. The addition or subtraction of specific 
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variables may considerably change results.  Similarly, rescaling one or more variables (e.g. logged 
or linear form) may have a big effect on the coefficient estimates of other variables (Winship, 1999, 
11).  
According to the simple correlation between variables (Appendix 1), there might be a problem of 
multicollinearity, as there is a high correlation between logarithm of the product of real GDPs per 
capita (referred later in text as: GDPcap) and Partner institutions (0,835 for import and export). 
Similarly, high colinearity between the GDP per capita and institutions was observed by 
Babetskaia-Kukharchuk & Maurel (2004, 691) in their study of the influence of the institutions on 
Russian trade. It is usually considered that correlation between independent variables of more than 
0,70 might be a problem and it requires further investigation.   
Variance inflation factor (VIF) is the most commonly used method to check for multicollinearity. In 
the presence of multicollinearity standard errors, and hence the variances, of the estimated 
coefficients are inflated. The variance inflation factor (VIF) is the factor by which the variance is 
inflated: 
 
𝑉𝐼𝐹𝑖 = 11−𝑅𝑖2                                                                                                                                      (19) 
 
Where 𝑅𝑖2 is the R-squared obtained by regressing the ith predictor on the remaining predictors. The 
VIF exists for each of the i predictors in a multiple regression model. A VIF of 1 signifies no 
correlation among the predictor and the remaining predictor variables, and hence not inflated 
variance. The opinions of the researches differ on how high the VIF has to be to signify a problem. 
The general rule of thumb is that VIFs exceeding 4 require closer attention, while VIFs exceeding 
10 are the evidence of serious multicollinearity. Although, some researches as Allison (2012) 
suggest to pay attention to the VIF greater than 2.50, which corresponds to an R-squared of 0,60 
with the other variables. The obtained results from the VIF estimation are presented in Table 5. 
 Table 1: Collinearity of the regressors  
 Log 
Distance 
Log pr. 
real GDP 
Log pr. real per 
capita GDP 
Com. 
border 
Com. 
language 
Institutions 
Russia 
Institutions 
Partner 
Mean 
VIF 
Import VIF 1.73 1.67 4.48 1.77 1.77 1.02 3.83 2.32 
1/VIF 0.58 0.60 0.22 0.57 0.57 0.98 0.26 
Export VIF 1.63 1.56 3.70 1.62 1.62 1.02 3.38 2.08 
1/VIF 0.61 0.64 0.27 0.62 0.62 0.98 0.30 
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Table 5 provides no evidence of serious multicollinearity, because all the VIFs are much lower than 
10. Although, the GDPcap variable is still a concern, especially for import, as the VIF of this 
variable is the highest and it highly correlates with the variable of Partner institutions.  
Several measures can be employed to tackle the problem of multicollinearity such as collecting the 
additional data or new data, respecifying the model or dropping a problem variable (Grewal et al., 
2004, 521). In this thesis, the Author follows Babetskaia-Kukharchuk & Maurel (2004) and 
provides estimates both with and without the GDPcap variable. The opinions whether the GDP 
per capita should be included in the gravity equation differ. Bergstrand (1989) argues that the GDP 
per capita should be included in the equation as it measures the influence of the level of 
development on trade, whereas Anderson & Van Wincoop (2003) present estimates without the 
GDP per capita. In this thesis, when the variable GDPcap is dropped from the OLS regression, the 
VIFs for all the variables in both equations take the value below 2. 
Estimations of the gravity model, using the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) method, the Instrumental 
Variable (IV) method, both corrected for heteroskedasticity, and Poisson Pseudo Maximum 
Likelihood (PPML) method, including and excluding the GDPcap variable, are reported in Table 6. 
The results for the first stage of the IV estimates are presented in Appendix 2. 
Table 2: Gravity model estimates 
Export 
 OLS (GDPpercap) OLS 
IV 
(GDPpercap) IV 
PPML 
(GDPpercap) PPML 
Log Distance -1,960***   (0,08) 
-1,990*** 
(0,08) 
-1,964***    
(0,26) 
-1,853***  
(0,11) 
-1,728***  
(0,10) 
-1,821*** 
(0,10) 
Log pr. real GDP 1,102***  (0,04) 
1,129***  
(0,03) 
1,047*** 
(0,08) 
0,964*** 
(0,05) 
0,878***  
(0,03) 
0,911*** 
(0,03) 
Log pr. real per capita 
GDP    
0,199** 
(0,07)  
-3,820* 
(1,53)  
0,265***  
(0,06)  
Common border 0,650**    (0,22) 
0,606** 
(0,21) 
-0,619 
(0,66) 
0,491  
(0,26) 
0,220 
(0,14) 
0,089 
(0,13) 
Common language 1,350***  (0,23) 
1,340***  
(0,22) 
2,811** 
(0,91) 
1,727*** 
(0,28) 
0,466* 
(0,19) 
0,513** 
(0,19) 
Institutions Russia 0,743***  (0,15) 
0,819***  
(0,15) 
8,915*** 
(2,45) 
3,292***  
(0,36) 
0,962*** 
(0,16) 
0,980***   
(0,16) 
Institutions Partner -0,217***   (0,05) 
-0,093** 
(0,04) 
3,772* 
(1,53) 
0,290***   
(0,08) 
-0,276*** 
(0,06) 
-0,142** 
(0,05) 
Constant 2,862* (1,25) 
4,895*** 
(1,10) 
19,855* 
(10,12) 
-3,780*   
(1,71) 
6,036*** 
(1,38) 
9,777*** 
(1,14) 
Obs. 1586 1586 1471 1471 1754 1754 
R-squared 0,697 0,695 -0,883 0,626 0,506 0,482 
RESET p-values 0,2203 0,0749 0,0000 0,0000 0,6924 0,8861 
Linktest p-values 0,156 0,033 0,000 0,597 0,722 0,893 
Import 
 OLS OLS IV IV PPML PPML 
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(GDPpercap) (GDPpercap) (GDPpercap) 
Log Distance -0,975***  (0,11) 
-0,970***     
(0,10) 
-1,324***  
(0,23) 
-0,660***  
(0,14) 
-1,004*** 
(0,10) 
-1,152***    
(0,10) 
Log pr. real GDP 1,418*** (0,04) 
1,411***   
(0,04) 
1,274***  
(0,07) 
1,187***   
(0,06) 
0,922*** 
(0,03) 
0,958***    
(0,03) 
Log pr. real per capita 
GDP 
-0,035 
(0,09)  
3,493***   
(0,95)  
0,346*** 
(0,06)  
Common border 1,481***   (0,21) 
1,489*** 
(0,21) 
2,088***  
(0,42) 
1,614***  
(0,23) 
1,185*** 
( 0,12) 
0,966***    
(0,10) 
Common language 2,413*** (0,26) 
2,404***    
(0,26) 
-0,079 
(0,87) 
2,819***  
(0,33) 
1,089*** 
(0,17) 
1,155***    
(0,18) 
Institutions Russia 0,426* (0,21) 
0,416* 
(0,21) 
-2,906 
(1,53) 
2,312***  
(0,41) 
0,662*** 
(0,12) 
0,713***    
(0,13) 
Institutions Partner 0,007 (0,08) 
-0,015 
(0,05) 
-3,465*** 
(0,94) 
0,401***  
(0,11) 
-0,330*** 
(0,04) 
-0,150***   
(0,03) 
Constant -10,256***   (1,78) 
-10,580***   
(1,45) 
-31,713***  
(5,57) 
-17,279 *** 
(2,04) 
-2,024 
(1,34) 
3,135** 
(1,04) 
Obs. 1226 1226 1187 1187 1754 1754 
R-squared 0,663 0,663 -0,034 0,614 0,775 0,733 
RESET p-values 0,0000 0,0000 0,0006 0,0000 0,0696 0,5094 
Linktest p-values 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,357 0,117 0,552 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
 
According to Table 6 the gravity model is correctly specified as most of the results are consistent 
across the models: the estimated coefficients are statistically significant and the signs are in line 
with the model predictions. The results across all the estimation methods are in line with the basic 
theoretical gravity model: trade flows are predicted based on the distance within two units as well as 
their respective economic dimensions, where distance is measured in terms of the geographical 
distance between two countries and economic dimensions are presented by the economic size of the 
countries (GDP). The obtained R-squared differs between the models but it is high enough to 
conclude that the regression line fits the observations relatively well (not considering the special 
case of the IV method with the GDPcap variable, that will be discussed in more detail later in this 
chapter). The Author believes that the difference in the R-squared between export and import can be 
explained by the different amount of zeros in the data (with import having more zero observations 
than export). 
The findings in the Table 6 give a broad confirmation to the conclusion made by Silva & Tenreyro 
(2006), that estimating the gravity model with the PPML method tends to produce lower (absolute) 
estimated coefficients of distance and other trade costs parameters (such as common border and 
common language).  
The coefficients of the product of real GDPs are positive and highly significant in all estimations. 
These make good economic sense as, according to the gravity theory, the amount of bilateral trade 
is promoted by the economic size (GDP) of the countries and larger countries tend to trade more.  
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The estimated coefficient for the logarithm of distance implies that 1 percentage point increase in 
distance decreases export by 1,96 percentage points and import by 0,98 percentage points (see 
Column 1, Table 6). Distance has a larger impact on Russian exports than on imports. The obtained 
results for the distance coefficients are higher, but still in a comparable range with the results 
obtained for Russian export, without taking into account institutional variables. Lissovolik & 
Lissovolik (2004, 30) observed the coefficient for the logarithm of distance of -1,22 (OLS for years 
1995-2002), while in this thesis the coefficient is -1,96.  
Sharing a border has a positive effect on trade under OLS, but no significant effect under the PPML 
and the IV methods in the case of export. This finding contradicts the observations by Silva & 
Tenreyro (2006, 651), where they found that common border is not significant under OLS, but is 
significant under PPML.  
Sharing a common language has similar positive effects under OLS and PPML, but PPML produces 
lower estimations than OLS. Russian trade with countries that are able to speak the Russian 
language is larger than with countries not speaking Russian, according to OLS 286% (for export) 
and 1017% (for import), and according to PPML 60% (for export) and 197% (for import)4
An interesting finding was found that when controlling for the GDPs per capita, in some cases the 
coefficient for this variable becomes negative. Following a discussion by Frankel et al. (1997, 60-
61) and Sleptsova (2007), two competing hypotheses can be taken into consideration, when 
interpreting the negative sign of this variable. According to the Heckscher-Ohlin theory of trade the 
sign of the coefficient should be positive, denoting a positive sign on the difference between per 
capita incomes, as countries with different endowments (capital/labour ratios, proxied by GDP per 
capita) will tend to trade more with each other. To the contrary, another perspective was suggested 
by Linder (1961). It states that countries with similar per capita incomes will produce similar, but 
differentiated, products and will have similar preferences. With bigger difference between GDPs 
per capita, countries will trade less with each other. Thus, the negative sign might reflect that the 
country trades more with countries of similar level of income. Although in the case of this thesis, 
, for the 
specification with the GDPcap variable. The Author believes that so big numbers can be explained, 
firstly, by strong ties between Russia and former USSR countries that are still present after the 
collapse of the USSR. Secondly, very low percentage of the Russian population knows a foreign 
language. According to the calculations done by the Author, based on the All-Russia population 
census of 2010 statistics, the percentage of the Russian population, knowing the English language is 
5 %, while up to 99% of the population knows Russian language. 
                                                        
4  (≈exp(𝑏𝑖) - 1), where 𝑏𝑖 is the estimated coefficient 
 42  
the explanation for the negative sign of the GDPcap variable might be the one suggested by Yu 
(2010, 296), who observed similar effect for China. When the variables for institutional quality are 
not controlled for, the bias appears in the gravity equation and part of the positive effect of 
institutions on trade is misattributed to per capita income. 
The results of the gravity equation specified with the GDPcap variable and without differ 
significantly, especially in the IV method. With the inclusion of the variable, the R-squared for the 
IV becomes negative in export and import, and the coefficients for institutions in the case of import 
have a negative sign. Whereas in the cases when the variable is dropped, the R-squared is 
considerably high and institutional coefficients are positive in both export and import. The standard 
formula for calculating the R-squared is: 𝑅2 = 1 −  𝑆𝑆𝑅/𝑆𝑆𝑇, where SSR is the sum of squared IV 
residuals, and SST is the total sum of squares. Unlike the case of OLS, the R-squared from IV 
estimation can be negative as SSR for IV can be larger than SST. 
The major difference (from negative to positive) in the coefficients in the specifications with the 
GDPcap variable and without in the import equation may be the result of the multicollinearity 
problem. As it was discussed above the VIF of 4,48 of the GDPcap variable in the import case was 
a concern, as it was the highest VIF among the estimates. This finding goes along with the 
statement done by Wooldridge (2009, 523) that multicollinearity in the case of the IV method can 
be more serious compared to the OLS method due to the fact that the variance of a coefficient in the 
IV estimation is larger than that of the OLS.  
When comparing the results of the OLS and the PPML methods with specification with the product 
of the GDPs per capita and without, we can see that the exclusion of this variable does not influence 
much the quality of the estimates.  By comparing the R-squared across models we can see that in 
the case of OLS the R-squared does not change when the GDPcap variable is excluded. In the case 
of PPML it decreases, but the decrease is not high.  
When a variable is excluded from the estimation, there is a threat that the model will be 
misspecified. To check for the misspecification of the model the Ramsey RESET specification test 
can be used.  More detailed discussion on this test will be provided in Chapter 7.3.2. For the case of 
export, according to the RESET test of the OLS, both equations with and without the variable are 
specified correctly, although the specification without the variable gets a lower result of the p-value 
in the test (0,0749 compared to 0,2203 with the variable). The reason for this might be that in export 
the GDPcap variable is significant, which means that dropping it out will deteriorate the model. In 
the case of import, the RESET test shows that both OLS models are misspecified. In PPML 
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estimations for export and import the RESET test shows a significant improvement of the model, 
when the variable GDPcap is excluded, despite it is statistically significant. 
To sum up, a considerable difference can be observed between the estimations with the GDPcap 
variable and without. It seems that this variable is more a concern in the case of import, because of 
the higher collinearity with the variable of Partner institutions. In order to be able to compare the 
models the same variables should be included. As it was discussed above, the exclusion of the 
variable does not bias much the OLS estimates and in case of PPML and IV estimates it leads to 
model improvement.  
7.2   Influence of institutions on trade  
As one of the main focuses of this thesis is the influence of the institutions on trade, this chapter 
discusses the impact of Partner and Russian institutions on Russian trade in more detail. According 
to the results presented in the Table 6, the coefficients of institutions differ significantly within 
various estimation methods. 
The important observation, obtained from the Table 6, is that the institutional variables are highly 
statistically significant in most of the estimations. That supports the statement by Anderson and 
Marcouiller (2002), that it is essential to include institutional variables in the gravity equation in 
order to obtain unbiased results. 
Another important result for this thesis is that the coefficients for Russian institutions are always 
positive5
As it was discussed in Chapter 
, which signifies that the improvement of institutional quality implies a potential for trade 
increase. Hence, a one-scale increase in the Russian institutional quality leads to around a 96 
percentage point increase in export and 66 percentage point increase in import in case of PPML.  
3, it is expected that the quality of Russian institutions will be 
improved due to the WTO membership. The improvement in the quality of institutions will increase 
trade, as it was shown above. In order to assess the potential trade increase from the improvement 
of the institutions, actual trade of Russia should be compared to a counterfactual situation in which 
Russian institutions had achieved the quality level of the EU institutions. The EU institutions are a 
good benchmark as the average quality of the EU institutions is considerably high. In the year 2011 
Russian institutions scored 3,97 and the average score of the EU institutions was 7,35. The increase 
of the Institutional variable would yield to increase in trade, as the Institutional variable is positively 
related to the trade flow: 
                                                        
5 Except for the case of the IV method with GDPcap in import, where the coefficient is not significant 
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𝑋 = 𝛼𝑅𝑢𝑠(𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠𝐸𝑈 − 𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑅𝑢𝑠)                                                                             (20) 
from which it follows that  
𝑒𝑋 − 1 = 𝑒𝛼𝑅𝑢𝑠�𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠𝐸𝑈−𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑅𝑢𝑠� − 1                                                                         (21) 
Where X is the Russian export or import, InstitutionsEU  and InstitutionsRus  are institutional 
coefficients for the EU and Russia, 𝛼𝑅𝑢𝑠 is the obtained coefficient for Russian institutions from 
Table 6 and the term 𝑒𝑋 − 1  represents the potential increase in Russian trade implied by an 
improvement of the quality of Russian institutions to the EU standards (Babetskaia-Kukharchuk & 
Maurel, 2004). Therefore, in the OLS estimations export will increase by 32% and import by 15%, 
and by 204% and 118% respectively in the IV estimation. In the PPML estimation, export has a 
potential to increase up to 39%6
4
 and import up to 27%. It can be seen that the export is due to 
increase more than import according to both estimations. It is worth to mention, that this result 
contradicts the theory, discussed earlier in Chapter  that stated that institutions of the importer 
country matter more than the institutions of the exporter country. For the case of Russia it can be 
seen that Russian institutions matter more for the Russian export than import, as the export is due to 
increase more than import if the quality of the Russian institutions improved. This situation is 
beneficial for Russia as it is the net exporter country, with its total exports higher than its total 
imports (discussed previously in Chapter 6). 
The coefficient of the Partner institutions is negative in the PPML estimations and the OLS 
estimations in the case of export, which means that the better the quality of the institutions of 
Russian partners, the less Russia will be trading with them. This may be because institutional 
quality is not exogenously given and is affected by trade. Similar observation of significant 
difference in the results between an empirical method controlling for endogeneity, on the one hand, 
and PPML and OLS estimations, on the other, was made by Berger et al. (2012). Once the 
endogeneity issue is controlled in this thesis, with the help of the IV method, both institutional 
variables, for Russia and for Partner, become highly statistically significant and influence positively 
trade. The coefficients for the institutional quality are much smaller when endogeneity is not 
controlled compared to when it is accounted for, which is similar to the result, obtained by Yu 
(2008, 20). Without controlling for endogeneity, the positive effects of institutions on trade are 
underestimated because they are undercut by the reverse negative effects of trade on institutions. It 
is worth to notice, that during the current crisis and the slowdown of the world economy Partner                                                         
6 ≈EXP(0.97*(0.735-0.397))-1  
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institutions may play a negative role for the Russian trade. Thus, according to Merkulov (2012), the 
anti-crisis measures of Russian trade partners may hinder Russian export. Those measures require 
close monitoring and taking appropriate actions by the Russian authorities to protect domestic 
producers. 
Another possible reason why the coefficient of Partner institutions varies significantly across 
different estimation methods is the little variation over time of this variable. As it was discussed in 
Chapter 6.2, the variable with little variation can produce coefficients with high variation over the 
estimation methods. Therefore, this might be the reason for the results in Table 6: in the import case 
the coefficient for Partner institutions is insignificant in the OLS method and very significant in the 
IV and PPML methods; in the case of export the coefficient is negative in the OLS and PPML 
methods, but positive in the IV method. Similar major changes in the coefficients for the variables 
with little variation over time were observed by Baccaro & Rei (2007). As the institutional variables 
were obtained by taking the arithmetic mean of three institutional indexes, the problem of little time 
variation of the variables could have gotten worse due to averaging. Therefore, each index was 
included in the first stage IV estimation one at a time to check if one of those variables produces 
better results. As it can be seen from Appendix 3, the results of the IV estimation with separate 
institutional variables are close to those with the average of those variables. Therefore, taking the 
arithmetic mean of three institutional variables in this thesis is justified. 
To sum up, the institutions play a significant role in determining Russian trade flows. Russian 
institutions are always highly significant in the case of export, while in the case of import they 
obtain higher significance level in PPML and IV estimation without the GDPcap variable. Partner 
institutions obtain a positive and significant coefficient only when the endogeneity is controlled for, 
which means that there is a strong reverse causality between Partner institutions and Russian trade. 
7.3 Additional tests  
This chapter discusses post estimation tests that are performed in order to check for the robustness 
of the results. First, the analysis of the IV method is presented, that consists of checking for the 
quality of the chosen instrumental variables and comparison of the OLS and IV methods. Second, 
all the three methods (OLS, IV and PPML) are compared and the criteria of choosing the most 
appropriate model are discussed.  
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7.3.1 Instrumental variable method 
As it was discussed in the Chapter 7.1 the results of the IV method improve with the exclusion of 
the GDPcap variable. That is why in this chapter only the specification of the model without this 
variable will be considered.  
The results of the IV method highly depend on the quality of the chosen instrumental variables. 
Therefore, it is important to test how the instrumental variables fulfill the necessary conditions of 
good instruments: the instrument should correlate with the variable and not correlate with the 
variable’s error term. To fully justify the validity of the instrumental variables, some additional tests 
should be reported.  
Additional tests are started with checking whether the instrumented variables for Russian and 
Partner institutions are really endogenous. If the null hypothesis of the Durbin-Wu-Hausman test is 
rejected the variables are endogenous (Cameron & Trivedi, 2009, 183). The null hypothesis is 
rejected at a highly significance level (p=0,0000, and a robust regression F statistic 67 for export 
and 24 for import). Apart from endogeneity, this test is sometimes used to check whether the OLS 
approach is more efficient than the IV. As the variables proved to be endogenous, we can make a 
conclusion that the IV approach might be more efficient. In order to compare the IV and the OLS 
methods further, the Hausman specification test is performed. The test has a chi-squared 
distribution and the degrees of freedom are usually equal to the number of instruments. The test 
compares the differences between the OLS and the IV coefficients. According to the test, the IV 
estimator b will be consistent under both the null hypothesis and the alternative. While the OLS 
estimator B will be consistent and unbiased, and more efficient than the IV estimator under the null 
hypothesis, but it will be inconsistent if the null hypothesis is false. The null hypothesis is rejected 
in both export and import, signifying that IV estimator is more efficient than the OLS estimator. 
Furthermore, according to the LINK test, which will be discussed in Chapter 7.3.2, the IV method 
(without the GDPcap variable) performs better than the OLS method (due to higher p-values). 
Next, several tests are performed to see whether the instruments are correctly chosen for the 
estimation. Firstly, the simple correlation between the instrumented variables (Russian and Partner 
institutions) and the instruments (country's infant mortality rate, ELF variable) is checked. It is 
found that a country's infant mortality rate is highly correlated with its institutions (-0,6964 for 
Partner countries and -0,5549 for Russia), as well as ELF variable highly correlates with the quality 
of Partner institutions (-0,3625). That signifies that the instruments pass one of the tests of good 
instruments. 
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Secondly, the possibility of weak instruments is taken into consideration. In order to check for weak 
instruments, the Anderson-Rubin Wald test of joint significance of endogenous regressors is used 
after the first stage of the IV estimates (The results of the first stage estimates are presented in 
Appendix 2). The null hypothesis of the test is the joint insignificance of the endogenous regressors. 
This hypothesis is rejected with a highly significant p-value (and the value of F statistic 40,45 for 
exports and 15,78 for imports). That means that the joint effect of the instrumental variables is 
significant in both cases. 
Finally, in order to justify the validity of the IV method, several post estimation tests are discussed. 
The tests are done with the help of the ivreg2 command that allows performing several important 
tests7
Firstly, the Underidentification test is performed. The test checks whether the IV equation is 
identified. The excluded instruments should be relevant and they should correlate with the 
endogenous regressors. The test uses Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic and tests the rank of a matrix. 
The null hypothesis is that the equation is underidentified under t
. This command is an alternative to the Stata's official ivregress command.  
8
Secondly, to test for Overidentification, the Sargan-Hansen test is performed. The joint null 
hypothesis of the test is that the instruments are valid instruments (uncorrelated with the error term, 
and that the excluded instruments are correctly excluded from the estimated equation). The test 
statistic is distributed as chi-squared in the number of (L-K) overidentifying restrictions. The test 
does not reject the null hypothesis with a high significance level of 77% for export and 28% for 
import. Hence, the instruments used in this thesis are valid instruments.  
. The test statistic is distributed as 
chi-squared with degrees of freedom equaling (L1-K1+1). In this thesis the null hypothesis is 
rejected in the export and import cases, which signifies that the model is identified (the matrix is 
full column rank).  
In conclusion, the instruments for the IV method are correctly chosen, so that the IV estimations 
provide feasible results. According to all the test results for the import, the IV method is more 
efficient than the OLS method. For the export case, only OLS passes the RESET test, but the results 
of the LINK test with a specification without the GDPcap variable signify that the IV method is 
better due to the higher p-values. As the Hausman test suggests that the IV method is preferable, we 
can conclude that this method outperforms the OLS method in both export and import cases.     
                                                        
7  See: BaumC., Schaffer M., Stillman S. (2010) ivreg2: Stata module for extended instrumental variables/2SLS, 
GMM and AC/HAC, LIML and k-class regression.  http://ideas.repec.org/c/boc/bocode/s425401.html 
8   The matrix of reduced form coefficients on the L1 excluded instruments has rank=K1-1 where K1 equals the number  
     of endogenous regressors. 
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7.3.2 Comparison of empirical models 
In order to compare different empirical methods and decide which method provides proper model 
specification the heteroskedasticity-robust Regression Equation Speciﬁcation Error Test ( RESET) 
(Ramsey, 1969) is used. This test was suggested by Silva & Tenreyro (2006) in order to check the 
adequacy of the estimation results provided by different empirical models. The RESET test is 
popular among the researchers using PPML, as it has been used in many recent economics papers, i. 
e. McAuslanda & Millimet (2012),  Thorbeckea & Kato (2012), Matos & Faustino (2012). 
The test checks for the correct specification of the conditional expectation. It is performed by 
adding and checking for the significance of an additional regressor, constructed as (x′b)2, where b 
is the vector of estimated parameters. The null hypothesis of the test is that the model is specified 
correctly and an additional regressor does not improve the model. Therefore, the coefficient of the 
added additional regressor equals zero. If the RESET test p-value is insignificant, the test provides 
no evidence of misspecification. The p-values, obtained for different estimation methods, are 
reported at the bottom of Table 6. In the export case, considering both specifications with and 
without the GDPcap variable, the p-values are insignificant for OLS and PPML and significant for 
the IV method. Therefore, the model is correctly specified only with OLS and PPML methods. 
Moreover, the obtained p-values are higher for PPML (0,6924 and 0,8861 compared to 0,2203 and 
0,0749 in OLS). This means that for PPML we cannot reject the hypothesis that the model is 
correctly specified at any significance level below 69% (with the GDPcap variable) and 89% 
(without the variable). For the case of import, the results differ from those obtained for the export 
case. Only PPML passes the RESET test and provides no evidence of misspecification of the 
gravity equations estimated using the PPML.  
In order to choose the right estimation method, it is suggested by several authors such as Steinbach 
(2012), Martínez-Zarzoso & Márquez-Ramos (2007), Olper &Raimondi (2008) to perform the 
LINK test to detect model specification errors, as an alternative to the RESET test. According to the 
test, if the model is specified correctly, it should not be possible to find any additional independent 
variable that will be significant. Two new variables are constructed in the test, a prediction variable 
(hat) and a variable of the square prediction (hatsq). The new variables are used as predictors to refit 
the model. In case the model is specified correctly, the prediction squared should not have 
explanatory power (Statabase reference manual). The p-values for the prediction squared are 
reported in Table 6. For Russian import, the results of the test showed that the variable square 
prediction was significant for all the OLS results and the IV (with the GDPcap variable), indicating 
a misspecification of those models. For the export, the test showed that the model was specified 
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incorrectly in the cases of OLS (without the GDPcap variable) and IV (with the GDPcap variable). 
For both export and import, the PPML method (without the GDPcap variable) passed the LINK test 
with the high p-values (0,893 and 0,552 for export and import respectively). 
To sum up, two tests have been used to check for the robustness of the results. The OLS for exports 
passed both of the tests, whereas for imports strong evidence of severe misspecification was found. 
The IV method was not specified correctly when the GDPcap variable was included. IV method 
without this variable only passed the LINK test. The PPML method passed all the tests and did not 
show signs of misspecification. It is worth to notice, that according to the results of the two tests, 
the gravity model is better, when the variable GDPcap is dropped. This result is possibly due to the 
high correlation between this variable and the Partner institutions. When comparing the three 
estimation methods, a conclusion can be made that the OLS and the IV methods are outperformed 
by the PPML method. The reason for this is that the PPML method provides more accurate 
estimation results when zero trade flows represent a large fraction of the data, as it was stated by 
Silva & Tenreyro (2006). 
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Conclusions 
The aim of this thesis has been to study the impact of the WTO on Russian export and import 
through the improvement of the quality of Russian institutions; in addition the influence of Partner 
institutions on the Russian trade was assessed. Despite the importance of the influence of Russian 
accession to the WTO on its trade, little research has been done on this topic, especially through the 
perspective of improved institutional quality.  
The theoretical part of this thesis concentrated on explaining the mechanisms of the influence of the 
WTO on trade. First, the general impact of the WTO on trade was discussed. It was noticed that the 
opinions of the researchers diverse whether the accession to the WTO influences trade or not. It was 
concluded that one of the reasons for a diversity of the research results was that the institutional 
quality was not taken into consideration. Thus, the aim of this thesis can be justified. Second, the 
influence of the WTO on institutions was considered with special attention paid to the case of 
Russia. This part showed that the WTO plays a big role in the improvement of institutional quality 
of the country by obliging the countries to make commitments during the accession process. But, 
despite the WTO encouraging and helping the improvements, the results depend on the willingness 
of the authorities of the country to introduce changes, which is especially true in the case of Russia 
as it is a big country. Third, the impact of the institutions on trade was assessed. The theoretical 
model was presented in order to show that better quality institutions encouraged higher level of 
trade, due to the fact that the traders preferred higher levels of contract enforcement as it increased 
the probability to be matched at the market and sell their products. The review of the empirical 
literature also supported the evidence that institutional improvement had a positive impact on trade.  
The empirical findings of this thesis supported the earlier suggestions that institutions should be 
considered when estimating the trade flows. The gravity equation was estimated with a simple 
ordinary least square (OLS) method, Poisson Pseudo-Maximum Likelihood (PPML) method, to 
account for the fact that the sample included a large number of zero observations, and Instrumental 
Variable (IV) method to consider possible endogeneity of institutional variables. The coefficient of 
the variable of the major interest, the quality of Russian institutions, proved to be highly significant 
in most of the cases and always had a positive impact on trade.  Russian export has a potential to 
increase up to 39% and import up to 27% in the PPML estimates if Russian institutions obtained the 
quality of the European institutions. As for the Partner institutions, they proved to influence 
positively Russian trade only when endogeneity was accounted for.  
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The results of the econometric methods used in this thesis were checked for robustness with two 
tests (RESET test and LINK test). The results of the tests proved that the PPML method 
outperformed the OLS and the IV methods, confirming the previous findings that the PPML method 
was more appropriate in the case of the large number of zero trade observations in the data. But it is 
important to address as well the issue of endogeneity of institutional variables, as the IV method 
produced different results and turned out to be more efficient than the OLS method.  
As this study proved positive impact of Russian institutions on Russian trade, the possible idea for 
the future research can be performing same estimations with the data on the development of 
Russian institutions after accession to the WTO, to see how close the predictions of this research 
were to the real situation.  
In conclusion, it was possible to perceive quite precisely the impact of the WTO accession on 
Russian trade through the institutions. The obligations that Russia is due to fulfill due to its 
accession to the WTO will help to improve the quality of Russian institutions, which will in turn 
increase its trade. But Russian policymakers should understand that the WTO is not a remedy to all 
the institutional problems that are present nowadays in Russia and the positive effects from the 
membership in the WTO can be explored only with the willingness of the Russia authorities to 
implement the WTO rules and recommendations in practice. 
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Appendix  
Appendix 1: Simple Correlation between Variables  
 
Import 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
(1) Log Export 1,000        
(2) Log pr. real per capita GDP 0,425 1,000       
(3) Log Distance -0,450 -0,195 1,000      
(4) Common language 0,216 -0,098 -0,459 1,000     
(5) Common border 0,330 0,077 -0,463 0,506 1,000    
(6) Institutions Partner 0,420 0,835 -0,246 -0,091 0,107 1,000   
(7) Institutions Russia 0,081 0,083 -0,000 -0,002 0,000 0,008 1,000  
(8) Log pr. real GDP 0,623 0,420 -0,314 -0,053 0,091 0,490 0,067 1,000 
   
Export 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
(1) Log Export 1,000        
(2) Log pr. real per capita GDP 0,394 1,000       
(3) Log Distance -0,550 -0,195 1,000      
(4) Common language 0,240 -0,098 -0,460 1,000     
(5) Common border 0,325 0,076 -0,462 0,510 1,000    
(6) Institutions Partner 0,367 0,835 -0,246 -0,091 0,106 1,000   
(7) Institutions Russia 0,100 0,083 -0,000  0,000 -0,000 0,008 1,000  
(8) Log pr. real GDP 0,641 0,420 -0,314 -0,051 0,090 0,490 0,067 1,000 
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Appendix 2: IV method First-stage regressions. 
Institutions Russia 
Export Import 
IV 
(GDPpercap) IV 
IV 
(GDPpercap) IV 
Log Distance -0,0034  (0,013)     
-0,0035   
(0,013)     
0,0024  
(0,014)      
0,0041  
 (0,014)     
Log pr. real GDP -0,0032   (0,004)    
-0,0031    
(0,004)     
-0,0023  
(0,005)    
-0,0034    
(0,005)    
Log pr. real per capita GDP    0,0004 (0,008)  
-0,0054  
 (0,010)     
Common border -0,0019 (0,032)   
-0,0020 
 (0,032)   
0,0040    
(0,034)   
0,0060  
 (0,034)    
Common language -0,0094 (0,039) 
-0,0097 
 (0,039)     
-0,0132   
(0,045)     
-0,0085  
(0,044)     
Infant mortality Russia -0,0689***   (0,003)   
-0,0689***   
(0,003)   
-0,0706***   
(0,004)   
-0,0705***   
(0,004)    
Infant mortality Partner 0,0001    (0,000)      
0,0001   
(0,000)      
-0,0003  
(0,001)     
-0,0001 
  (0,000)   
ELF Partner -0,0056   (0,032)   
-0,0057 
 (0,032)   
-0,0127 
(0,038)     
-0,0124 
   (0,038)    
Constant 4,8451***    (0,204)     
4,8515*** 
(0,168)    
4,9113***   
(0,247)     
4,8219***      
(0,186)     
Obs. 1471 1471 1187 1187 
R-squared 0,298 0,298 0,303 0,303 
Institutions Partner IV (GDPpercap) IV 
IV 
(GDPpercap) IV 
Log Distance -0,0501    (0,056)   
-0,3162***   
(0,074)    
-0,1292**   
 (0,049)    
-0,4855***  
(0,076)     
Log pr. real GDP 0,0281    (0,014)      
0,2205***    
(0,018)   
-0,0227   
 (0,015)    
0,1961***   
(0,021)    
Log pr. real per capita GDP 0,8857***    (0,046)    
 1,1409***    
(0,037)      
Common border 0,2550**    (0,086)     
-0,0333    
(0,150)   
 0,2008*   
 (0,077)     
-0,2209 
   (0,151)     
Common language -0,5006***   (0,142)   
-1,2073***  
 (0,180)   
-0,5907***   
(0,154)     
1,5729***  
(0,212)    
Infant mortality Russia 0,1039***    (0,011)     
0,0707***   
(0,013)   
0,1043***  
(0,010)      
0,0674***    
(0,015)     
Infant mortality Partner -0,0073**   (0,003)   
-0,0361***  
(0,001)   
0,0085***  
 (0,002)      
-0,0376*** 
(0,002)   
ELF Partner 0,1537   (0,119)    
0,0376 
   (0,144)     
0,2207    
(0,119)     
0,1667 
   (0,167)      
Constant -11,1874***    (1,023)    
2,7358**    
(0,910)      
-13,9081***  
(0,857)  
4,9294***   
(0,963)   
Obs. 1471 1471 1187 1187 
R-squared 0,726 0,569 0,769 0,534 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Appendix 3: IV method First-stage regressions with different institutional variables. 
Institutional variable: Rule of law 
Rule of law Russia 
Export Import 
IV 
(GDPpercap) IV 
IV 
(GDPpercap) IV 
Log Distance -0,003   (0,01)     
-0,001 
(0,01)  
-0,008 
  (0,01)   
-0,004  
(0,01) 
Log pr. real GDP -0,001    (0,00)   
-0,002 
 (0,00)    
-0,001    
(0,00)     
-0,003  
(0,00) 
Log pr. real per capita GDP    -0,007  (0,00)    
-0,013*  
(0,01)      
Common border 0,002   (0,02)   
0,004 
  (0,02)      
0,002 
(0,02)  
-0,001 
 (0,02) 
Common language -0,014   (0,02)     
-0,008 
(0,02)    
-0,029 
  (0,03)  
-0,012  
  (0,02)   
Infant mortality Russia -0,045***   (0,00)  
-0,045*** 
 (0,00) 
-0,046*** 
(0,00)    
-0,046*** 
(0,00)    
Infant mortality Partner -0,000   (0,00)     
-0,000 
   (0,00)     
-0,001    
(0,00)    
-0,000  
 (0,00)  
ELF Partner 0,005  (0,02) 
0,006 
    (0,02)    
0,003 
 (0,03)    
0,004  
(0,03)   
Constant 3,978***    (0,13)   
3,868***   
(0,10)    
4,134***  
(0,17)   
3,915***   
(0,13) 
Obs. 1476 1476 1060 1082 
R-squared 0,330 0,329 0,330 0,328 
Rule of law Partner IV (GDPpercap) IV 
IV 
(GDPpercap) IV 
Log Distance -0,190** (0,06)    
-0,472*** 
 (0,08)    
0,414*** 
  (0,11)      
0,236* 
   (0,11)     
Log pr. real GDP -0,034   (0,02)   
0,171*** 
  (0,02)    
0,165*** 
(0,04)    
0,247***   
(0,03) 
Log pr. real per capita GDP 0,945*** (0,05)  
0,544*** 
 (0,07)      
Common border 0,234** (0,09)   
-0,072 
(0,16)    
-0,112 
  (0,27)   
-0,021  
 (0,26)  
Common language -0,850***     (0,14)    
-1,603***    
(0,18)    
1,339*** 
  (0,36)     
0,655*  
 (0,33)   
Infant mortality Russia 0,113*** (0,01)     
0,078*** 
  (0,01) 
0,090*** 
  (0,02)     
0,066** 
   (0,02)     
Infant mortality Partner -0,008**    (0,00)   
-0,038*** 
 (0,00)   
0,010**   
(0,00)  
-0,012*** 
(0,00)     
ELF Partner 0,247    (0,13)   
0,112 
  (0,16)      
-0,298 
(0,32)     
-0,319  
  (0,30)    
Constant -9,729***  (1,10)   
5,094*** 
(1,01)   
-13,015***    
(1,66)    
-3,327* 
   (1,43)    
Obs. 1476 1476 1060 1082 
R-squared 0,706 0,541 0,167 0,115 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Institutional variable: Government effectiveness 
Government effectiveness 
Russia 
Export Import 
IV 
(GDPpercap) IV 
IV 
(GDPpercap) IV 
Log Distance -0,003    (0,01)     
-0,003 
   (0,01)  
-0,000 
   (0,01)    
-0,000  
(0,01) 
Log pr. real GDP -0,002  (0,00)   
-0,002    
(0,00)   
-0,002 
   (0,00)    
-0,001  
(0,00)  
Log pr. real per capita GDP    0,001   (0,01)    
0,001 
 (0,01)    
Common border -0,001   (0,03)   
-0,002   
(0,03) 
0,006 
   (0,03)     
0,008   
 (0,03)    
Common language -0,005   (0,03)    
-0,007 
  (0,03)    
-0,007 
 (0,04) 
-0,009    
(0,04)  
Infant mortality Russia -0,074***    (0,00)    
-0,074*** 
  (0,00)    
-0,073***    
(0,00)   
-0,073***   
(0,00)  
Infant mortality Partner 0,000    (0,00)      
0,000  
(0,00)     
0,000 
   (0,00)     
0,000    
(0,00)   
ELF Partner -0,003   (0,03)  
-0,004    
(0,03)  
0,009 
(0,04)     
0,009    
(0,04)  
Constant 5,115***    (0,18)    
5,136***   
(0,15)   
5,074***    
(0,24)     
5,089*** 
(0,18)  
Obs. 1471 1471 1044 1066 
R-squared 0,389 0,389 0,391 0,391 
Government effectiveness 
Partner 
IV 
(GDPpercap) IV 
IV 
(GDPpercap) IV 
Log Distance -0,014  (0,06)    
-0,279*** 
 (0,08)  0,417*** (0,11)      0,289*    (0,12)  
Log pr. real GDP 0,070*** (0,02) 
0,262*** 
  (0,02)    
0,160*** 
   (0,04)      
0,248***  
(0,03)    
Log pr. real per capita GDP 0,883***   (0,05)     
0,514***  
(0,07)       
Common border 0,302**  (0,10)    
0,014    
(0,16)   
-0,438  
(0,26)   
-0,307    
(0,24)    
Common language -0,483**  (0,15)    
-1,188*** 
   (0,19)    
1,250***    
(0,35)    
0,626* 
   (0,31)    
Infant mortality Russia 0,099***  (0,01) 
0,066*** 
   (0,01)     
0,082***   
(0,02)     
0,058**  
(0,02)     
Infant mortality Partner -0,008**  (0,00)    
-0,036*** 
  (0,00)    
0,002    
(0,00)     
-0,017***   
(0,00)   
ELF Partner 0,210   (0,13)   
0,094  
(0,15)      
-0,016    
(0,34)  
-0,133 
(0,32)  
Constant -12,399***  (1,06)   
1,482 
 (0,92)      
-12,154***    
(1,73)    
-3,581* 
   (1,45)    
Obs. 1471 1471 1044 1066 
R-squared 0,722 0,577 0,193 0,146 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001  
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Institutional variable: Regulatory quality       
Regulatory quality Russia 
Export Import 
IV 
(GDPpercap) IV 
IV 
(GDPpercap) IV 
Log Distance -0,001   (0,03)  
-0,002 
(0,03)    
0,011 
   (0,04)      
0,010   
(0,03)  
Log pr. real GDP -0,005  (0,01)   
-0,004    
(0,01)  
-0,006  
(0,01)  
-0,005   
(0,01) 
Log pr. real per capita GDP    0,003  (0,02)     
0,003  
 (0,02)  
Common border -0,002  (0,07)   
-0,003 
(0,07)   
0,007 
(0,08)     
0,011   
(0,08)  
Common language -0,006 (0,09)  
-0,009 
   (0,09)    
-0,003 
(0,10)    
-0,012   
(0,09)  
Infant mortality Russia -0,090***  (0,01)    
-0,090***   
(0,01)  
-0,087***  
  (0,01)   
-0,088***    
(0,01)  
Infant mortality Partner 0,000  (0,00)  
0,000 
(0,00) 
-0,000  
(0,00)  
-0,000  
 (0,00)    
ELF Partner -0,009  (0,07)   
-0,010   
(0,07)  
0,026  
(0,09)      
0,025  
(0,09) 
Constant 5,484***   (0,46)    
5,528*** 
(0,37) 
5,375***    
(0,62)   
5,413***    
(0,46)   
Obs. 1478 1478 1062 1084 
R-squared 0,127 0,127 0,123 0,124 
Regulatory quality Partner IV (GDPpercap) IV 
IV 
(GDPpercap) IV 
Log Distance 0,066  (0,06)     
-0,176* 
(0,07)   
0,388***  
(0,11)     
0,254*  
(0,11)    
Log pr. real GDP 0,045**   (0,01)     
0,222*** 
 (0,02)    
0,126**  
(0,04)     
0,209***     
(0,03)  
Log pr. real per capita GDP 0,824***  (0,05)    
0,527*** 
(0,06)       
Common border 0,244*    (0,10)     
-0,018 
  (0,15)     
-0,629* 
(0,24)    
-0,486*   
(0,21) 
Common language -0,165 (0,17)    
-0,818*** 
(0,20)  
1,162***  
(0,33)     
0,491  
(0,29)     
Infant mortality Russia 0,096***  (0,01)  
0,065*** 
 (0,01) 
0,095***   
(0,02)    
0,072***  
 (0,02)    
Infant mortality Partner -0,007*   (0,00)    
-0,033*** 
(0,00)   
0,002  
(0,00)    
-0,018***    
(0,00)  
ELF Partner -0,031 (0,13)  
-0,160 
  (0,15)  
-0,094  
(0,31)   
-0,220   
(0,29)    
Constant -11,283***  (1,07) 
1,649 
 (0,92)    
-11,366***    
(1,59)   
-2,385    
(1,31) 
Obs. 1478 1478 1062 1084 
R-squared 0,657 0,514 0,210 0,155 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
   
 
  
 
 
